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Despite policies for U.S. federal agencies to use open competitive procedures that 
increase small business participation in federal contracting, some small businesses do not 
win open competitive federal contracts. The purpose of this multiple case study was to 
explore the strategies some leaders of small businesses in the service industry have used 
to win open competitive U.S. federal contracts. The conceptual framework for this study 
was agency theory. The participants in this study were 6 leaders of small businesses in 
the state of Washington who successfully implemented strategies to win open 
competitive U.S. federal contracts. Data were collected through face-to-face, 
semistructured interviews and a review of company documents. Data were analyzed 
using Yin’s 5-phase cycle of compiling, disassembling, reassembling, interpreting, and 
concluding the data, resulting in the 3 key themes: opportunity identification strategy, 
requirements strategy, and bid submission strategy. The findings indicated that leaders of 
small businesses win U.S. federal contracts by identifying contracting opportunities that 
meet their business model and risk tolerance, strengthening their knowledge of contract 
requirements, and increasing their participation in competitive public procurements. The 
implications of this study for positive social change include the potential for leaders of 
small businesses to lower the unemployment rate through the creation of jobs, increased 
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Section 1: Foundation of the Study  
The economy of the United States depends on the success of small businesses. 
Most of the jobs created in the United States occur through actions of small business 
leaders (Lawless, 2014). The U.S. government supports the success of small business 
growth through ensuring active participation in federal contracting. The Small Business 
Act of 2013 supports full and open competition for small businesses to ensure growth 
prospects for small businesses and to ensure that small businesses receive a fair 
percentage of federal contracts, which strengthens the U.S. economy through job creation 
and economic development (U.S. Small Business Administration, 2017b). Officials 
within U.S. federal agencies seek and open competition in federal contracting to promote 
economic growth (Krivda & Bogart, 2014; Smirnova & Leland, 2016). Small business 
leaders contribute to the economic development of communities in the United States by 
winning federal contracts, creating jobs, and promoting innovation. 
Background of the Problem 
The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 mandates that federal agencies use 
full and open competition procedures that permit maximize participation from small 
businesses (Woods et al., 2014). Federal contract awards based on the act’s mandates 
establish the best value for taxpayers and agencies through more competitive pricing for 
goods and services (Krivda & Bogart, 2014). Further, most federal agencies adhere to the 
guidance in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) or an agency supplement that 
codify the requirements of the Competition in Contracting Act (Krivda & Bogart, 2014). 
FAR subpart 6.1, Full and Open Competition, outlines the requirement federal 
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contracting officers must follow to ensure contracts include competitive procedures 
(FAR, 2016a). Through provisions in FAR, federal agencies can bypass competition 
requirements under certain conditions. For instance, federal agencies allow contracting 
officers to earmark certain procurements for small businesses through a process called 
set-asides (FAR, 2016b). Federal set-aside is small business preference programs that are 
open to all classification of small businesses that allow contracting officers to award 
partial or total contracts to small businesses (FAR, 2016c).  
The U.S. Small Business Administration established federal agencies’ wide small 
business participation goal of 23% for prime contracts (U.S. Small Business 
Administration, 2017a). When agencies meet their small business goals, approximately 
$4 million dollars per percentage points of the 23% goes to small businesses (Shoraka, 
2014). However, there is the need for future research to investigate the benefit of set-
aside policies that refashion policies to meet national small business goals better 
(Gansler, Lucyshyn, & Burdg, 2015) as well as small businesses participation in public 
procurement (Loader & Norton, 2015). The inclusion of small businesses in federal 
procurement increases the value to the taxpayers by promoting competition and lowering 
prices for goods and services. 
Problem Statement 
Small businesses are not winning open competitive federal contracts despite 
policies for U.S. federal agencies to use open competitive procedures that increase small 
business participation in federal contracting (FAR, 2016a). In 2015, U.S. federal agencies 
spent over $500 billion dollars for goods and services in contract awards with only $35 
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billion or 7% awarded to small businesses using open competitive procedures (Shoraka, 
2014; U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 2017). The general business problem was 
that some small business leaders experience reduced profitability because of not winning 
open competitive U.S. federal contracts. The specific business problem was that some 
small business leaders in the service industry lack strategies to win open competitive U.S. 
federal contracts. 
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this qualitative multiple case study was to explore strategies some 
small business leaders in the service industry use to win open competitive U.S. federal 
contracts. The targeted population was small business leaders in six service industry 
companies located in the state of Washington who successfully implemented strategies to 
win open competitive U.S. federal contracts. The implications for positive social change 
include the potential for improved local job creation, local economic stability, and lower 
local unemployment. Improved local job creation, lower unemployment, and greater local 
economic activity occurs when small business owners win U.S. federal contracts (Doucet 
& Lee, 2014; Karadag, 2015; Reijonen, Tammi, & Saastamoinen, 2016; Walker & 
Preuss, 2008). 
Nature of the Study 
The three research methods are qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods 
(Almalki, 2016). Qualitative researchers seek to discover meaning of phenomenon 
through exploration, understanding, analysis, and interpretation (Ejimabo, 2015; Sutton 
& Austin, 2015). I selected the qualitative method to discover meaning of a phenomenon 
4 
 
through exploration and interpretation. In contrast, quantitative researchers use numeric 
data to test hypotheses for relationships or differences among variables (Ingham-
Broomfield, 2014). Mixed method researchers use a qualitative method combined with a 
quantitative approach (Landrum & Garza, 2015). I did not statistically test hypotheses 
using quantitative, numeric data; therefore, a quantitative or mixed method approach was 
not appropriate.  
I considered four research designs: (a) phenomenology, (b) ethnography, (c) 
narrative inquiry, and (d) case study. Phenomenological researchers explore the meanings 
of lived experiences of participants (Mayoh & Onwuegbuzie, 2015). Phenomenological 
research was not suitable for this study because I was not studying the meanings of 
participants’ lived experiences. Business researcher use ethnographic research to explore 
a phenomenon of a culture or group (Draper, 2015). I did not explore a culture or group; 
therefore, ethnographic research was not appropriate for this study. Narrative researchers 
present a chronological interpretation of the life stories of participants (Singh, Corner, & 
Pavlovich, 2015). Narrative research was not suitable for this study because I did not 
focus on the life stories of participants. Case study researchers explore a phenomenon in 
real life, bounded settings using a variety of data sources (Yin, 2018). Case study 
research was appropriate for this study because I explored a phenomenon in a real-life, 
bounded setting using multiple data sources. 
Research Question 
What strategies do some small business leaders in the service industry use to win 




1. What strategies do you use to identify U.S. federal contracting opportunities?  
2. What strategies do you use to prepare proposals and bids to win open 
competitive U.S. federal contracts?  
3. What strategies do you use to win open competitive U.S. federal contracts? 
4. What strategies are most effective in winning open competitive U.S. federal 
contracts?  
5. How do you measure the effectiveness of the strategies you use to win U.S. 
federal contracts?  
6. What challenges do you face in implementing strategies to win open U.S. 
federal contracts?  
7. How do you overcome the key challenges of implementing strategies to win 
U.S. federal contracts?  
8.  What other information can you provide regarding the strategies you use to 
win open competitive U.S. federal contracts? 
Conceptual Framework 
Agency theory, developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976), was the conceptual 
framework for this study. The key concepts of agency theory are (a) explaining the 
relationship between principals and agents, (b) conflicts of goals, (c) risk, and (d) 
contractual relationships (Bhattacherjee, 1998; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Principals 
delegate some decision-making authority to agents through contractual relationships 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Principals use incentives to ensure agents work in their best 
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interest (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The principal–agent relationship occurs when agency 
cost increases because of money paid to principals, the bonding costs incurred by agents, 
and the residual loss (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Competition reduces self-interested 
behaviors of agents, especially when businesses monopolize the product (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). The agency theory aligns with the purpose of the study because 
principal–agent contractual relationships influence small business relationships with 
federal agencies. I found that agency theory served as an effective lens to explore 
strategies small business leaders in the service industry use to win open competitive 
federal contracts. 
Operational Definitions 
The terms in this study are common to federal small business contracting.  
Contracting officer: A contracting officer is the person authorized to bind the 
government through contractual agreements (FAR, 2016a). 
Federal acquisition regulation (FAR): FAR is a regulation that provides the 
guidelines for those who procure goods and services for the U.S. Federal Government 
(FAR, 2016a). 
Open competition: Open competition is a procurement process that maximizes 
unrestricted competition in federal contracting (FAR, 2016a). 
Public procurement: Public procurement is an acquisition process that allows 




Set-aside: Set-aside is a procurement process that preferential treatment for 
specific small businesses to meet social economic policies (FAR, 2016a).  
System for Award Management: System for Award Management is the official 
U.S. government website for registering to do business with the federal government (U.S. 
General Service Administration, 2017). 
Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations 
Assumptions 
Assumptions are presumptions assumed as true, yet the researcher lacks the 
ability to verify (Marshall & Rossman, 2016). Six leaders in the service industry in the 
state of Washington volunteered to participate in a 45-minute interview. I assumed that 
the small business leaders answered questions truthfully and comprehensively. Another 
assumption was that the small business leaders possessed the knowledge to allow 
collection of credible data to determine the strategies use to win open competitive federal 
contracts. Finally, I assumed that the company documents reviewed were accurate, up-to-
date, and complete.  
Limitations 
Limitations are weaknesses within the study out of the researcher’s control 
(Marshall & Rossman, 2016). A limitation was that the integrity of the interview data 
remained dependent on the knowledge and experience of the leaders of the six small 
service companies; therefore, the interview data did not represent the total population of 
leaders of small service companies. Because of the limited boundaries of this case study, 
there is limited, if any, transferability by future researchers to other cases, settings, or 
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industries. Another limitation was that the sample population was small service business 
leaders; therefore, the sample population did not include large business leaders with 
successful strategies for winning open competitive federal contracts. The sample 
population was also restricted to the state of Washington.  
Delimitations 
Delimitations are the boundaries of the study that the researcher can control 
(Abramson, 2015). The geographic region of the state of Washington limited the scope of 
this study. The sample population of six small business leaders in the service industry 
was a delimitation. The eligibility criteria for participants of this study also limited the 
scope of this study. Another delimitation was answering the research questions that 
required my concentration on successful strategies leaders used to win open competitive 
U.S. federal contracts; therefore, I did not address other situations such as when strategies 
did not win open competitive U.S. federal contracts or other operational issues within 
small service companies. 
Significance of the Study 
Contribution to Business Practice  
Small business owners in the service industry might benefit from this study 
because of exposure to strategies for winning open competitive U.S. federal contracts. 
Small business owners who consistently win federal contracts can experience greater 
sustainability (Walker & Preuss, 2008). Additionally, procuring goods and services saves 
federal dollars when contracts are competitive, so U.S. government officials could 
increase or sustain efficiencies (Alonso, Clifton, & Díaz-Fuentes, 2015). Government 
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contracts frequently have a limited number of contractors providing bids for goods and 
services (Chever, Saussier, & Yvrande-Billon, 2017). The findings of this study might be 
of value to leaders of federal agencies to increase competition for contracts to provide 
value through obtaining efficiency through lower cost. Federal contracting officers might 
use the findings of this study to increase competition in federal procurements. Further, 
small business owners improve innovation and sustainability through winning U.S. 
federal contracts (Karadag, 2015; Walker & Preuss, 2008). Federal contracts awarded to 
small businesses positively affect business strategies, innovation, and business 
sustainability. 
Implications for Social Change 
The potential positive social change resulting from my study includes the 
enrichment of competition in federal contracting that provides cost savings, as more 
bidders tends to reduce costs. Small business owners who win competitive federal 
contracts create more jobs and contribute to the economic development of the 
communities in which they operate (Doucet & Lee, 2014; Karadag, 2015). Successful 
small business owners contribute to a lower unemployment rate and an increased 
standard of living in their local communities (Doucet & Lee, 2014; Spence, 2016). The 
success of small business owners winning federal contracts might contribute to more job 
growth, innovation, business sustainability, and an improved standard of living for 
residents of their local communities. 
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A Review of the Professional and Academic Literature 
The purpose of the literature review was to examine pertinent and significant 
existing literature to explore strategies some small business leaders in the service industry 
use to win open competitive U.S. federal contracts. The reviewed literature consisted of 
peer-reviewed journals articles, government reports, doctoral studies, dissertations, and 
seminal books. Additionally, I scrutinized literature concerning public procurement, 
government contracting, and competition to establish the foundation for answering the 
central research question of this study. 
I identified articles for review by using the following keywords: small businesses, 
contract, government procurement, government contracting, competition, public 
tendering, and public procurement. I searched the following databases: ProQuest 
Dissertations and Theses, EBSCO Host, Google Scholar, Business Source Complete, 
Sage Premier, and Thoreau Multi-Database Search. I also used Ulrich’s Global Serial 
Directory website to verify peer-reviewed articles. I reviewed literature from government 
publications, journal articles, books, and dissertations (see Table 1).  
Table 1 
 
Sources and Percentages 
Source Total Percentage 
Peer-reviewed articles 201 92% 
Articles published from 2015-2019 185 85% 
Conference proceedings 1 3.6% 
Nonpeer-reviewed articles 4 1.9% 
Seminal books 4 1.9% 
Government Publications 8 3.7% 
Sources unique to the literature review 88  




The purpose of this qualitative multiple case study was to explore strategies some 
small business leaders in the service industry use to win open competitive U.S. federal 
contracts. Small business leaders from six service companies located in the state of 
Washington who have found success employing strategies to win open competitive U.S. 
federal contracts represent the target population for this study. Small businesses that 
regularly win federal contacts might experience larger sustainability of their businesses 
(Walker & Preuss, 2008). The benefits to local job development, unemployment 
reduction, modernization, and local economic improvement also occur when small 
business owners win U.S. federal contracts (Doucet & Lee, 2014; Karadag, 2015; 
Reijonen et al., 2016; Walker & Preuss, 2008). Small business leaders inspiring job 
growth, improving innovation, and boosting the local economy are some of the potential 
benefits of this study. 
The literature review starts with a comprehensive synthesis of the origins of 
agency theory, which was the conceptual framework for this study. I summarize agency 
theory and contrasting theories. I also review relevant literature related to small business 
success factors that answered the central research question. 
Agency Theory 
Agency theory, developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976), is the conceptual 
framework for this study. Agency theory is one of the most accepted theories in 
management research (Bosse & Phillips, 2016). Agency theory is also the primary 
theoretical framework used to study executive compensation (Pepper & Gore, 2015). 
Researchers use agency theory to address conflicting goals and reduce conflicting 
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interests (Coletta, 2013). However, some researchers have questioned whether agency 
theory can adress modern business phenomena (Bendickson, Muldoon, Liguori, & Davis, 
2016) because some applications of agency theory for long-term relationships do not help 
develop solutions that allow principals and agents to meet goals like stewardship theory 
(Aßländer, Roloff, & Nayır, 2016). Additionally, researchers need foundational 
knowledge to apply agency theory across various disciplines (Bendickson et al., 2016). 
Moreover, another limitation of the theory involves the inability to account for a 
principal’s capacity to interpret an agent’s intentions, knowledge, and beliefs (Foss & 
Stea, 2014).  
Agency theory is the establishment of a reciprocal agreement in which the 
principal contracts with the agent to perform a service for the interest of the principal that 
includes assignment of decision-making authority to the agent (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Steinle, Schiele, & Ernst, 2014). Agency theory stems from conflicts between the 
principal’s encounter attempting to motivate agents to perform in the optimal interest of 
the principals (Biesenthal & Wilden, 2014). For example, managers act as agents to 
stakeholders motivated to work toward self-interest versus the interest of principals 
(Njuguna, 2016). It is also important for researchers to include a microeconomics 
foundation to agency theory to achieve cooperation among various actors (Coletta, 2013). 
Some researchers also use behavioral agency theory to avoid monitoring costs and 
incentives alignment by using behavioral economics (Pepper & Gore, 2015). Agency 
theorists and practitioners apply the tenets of agency theory to reduce agency cost, 
eliminate self-interested behavior, and improve relationship trust. 
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Agency theory is applied to principal and agent relationships to align the interest 
while reducing opportunistic behavior. Agency theorists have implied that the agent, if 
left unmonitored, would work toward self-interest at the cost of the principal (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Though monitoring agents increases agency cost for the principal 
(Bosse & Phillips, 2016), it is important for the principal to monitor the agent (Bøe, 
Gulbrandsen, & Sørebø, 2015). For example, principals may have insufficient 
information about the agent’s ability to create value for the principal’s business if the 
agent withholds key information (Bosse & Phillips, 2016; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Establishing a contractual relationship between principals and agents prevents 
opportunistic behavior by the agent (Njuguna, 2016). Thus, principals use monitoring and 
control mechanisms to align an agent’s goals with the objectives of the principal (Ditillo, 
Liguori, Sicilia, & Steccolini, 2015). However, agency problems arise when the goals of 
the principal and agent diverge, and the principal cannot verify the behavior of the agent 
due to information asymmetry (Battisti & Williamson, 2015).  
With agency theory, investigating the principal and agent framework captures the 
link between transactional costs and information asymmetries (Peterson, Smith, 
Leatherman, Hendricks, & Fox, 2015). Researchers have used transactional cost 
economics to examine the economic factors required to protect contractual relationships 
and governance structures versus that single focus of agency theory (Luo, Liu, Yang, 
Maksimov, & Hou, 2015). The utility of agency theory applies to understanding 
relationships in various transactional agreements between self-interested parties (Bøe et 
al., 2015). For example, the government as the principal in public procurement has 
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encountered agency problems related to information asymmetries, moral hazards, 
transaction costs, budget limitation, and cost inefficiencies (Vedel, Jacobsen, & Thorsen, 
2015). In contrast, small and medium enterprises establish single ownership and 
management structures without separations, preventing agency conflicts usually 
attributed to separating management and ownership (Yahya, Ali, & Ghazali, 2016).   
The contractual relationship between government principals and small business 
agents provides another transactional contract benefiting from applying the tenets of 
agency theory. Agency theory can allow researchers to explore the contractual 
relationship between the buyer (principal), and seller (agent), as it helps explain that the 
core of a business is the contractual relationships with customers, merchants, banks, 
investors, and other interested parties (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). For example, 
Bendickson et al. (2016) investigated principal–agent contractual relationships, finding 
that conflicts between agents and principals become imperfect when there are 
information asymmetries, increased cost resulting from monitoring activities, and 
principal’s difficulties asserting ownership rights. Principals and agents develop 
contractual relationships across industries that depend on balanced information between 
the actors to eliminate unnecessary monitoring that might increase agency costs.  
Agency theory applies to other principal and agent relationships aside from 
traditional business settings (Bøe et al., 2015). Sarhan, Pasquire, Manu, and King (2016) 
used agency theory as the foundation to investigate government agencies in the United 
Kingdom seeking to award contracts that eliminated waste and opportunistic behavior. 
Additionally, the U.S. federal government purchases more goods and services through 
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contracts than any other government in the world (Shoraka, 2014). In a contractual 
relationship, the principal establishes terms through contract development that bind the 
behavior of the agent; therefore, governments influence contractual relationships through 
legal constructs the government establishes using contracts (Bøe et al., 2015; Carpenter & 
Krause, 2015). The goal of developing the terms and condition of the contract is to 
provide the principal mechanisms of control and opportunities to monitor the behavior of 
the agents such as linking compensation to the agent’s performance to accomplish goals 
(Bøe et al., 2015; Lu, 2016). Principals also impose enrollment requirements on agents 
that grant the principal consent to monitor and apply consequences for noncompliance 
with the terms and conditions of the contracts (Peterson et al., 2015).  
The U.S. government, as the principal, uses warranted contract officers as agents 
to write and administer contracts for the procurement of goods and services. Contracting 
officers, principals of the U.S. government, use federal acquisition policies to monitor the 
financial status of contractors (agents) when the contractor’s financial stability indicate 
that subcontracts may not receive timely payments (FAR, 2017). For example, Peterson 
et al. (2015) studied payment for environment service contracts utilized by the United 
State Forestry Service for land conservation policies and discovered that conflicts arise 
when the landowners (agents) withhold information the U.S. Forestry Service needs 
before awarding contracts, which forces the principal to price the contracts at the lowest 
acceptable price to reduce all associated cost. This conflict reduces the pool of 
landowners willing to participant in conservation programs and creates a trust imbalance. 
But principals achieve cost savings when fair competition among agents exists (Hanák & 
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Muchová, 2015), as prices increase when competition decreases in the market (Lu, 2016). 
Costs also increase when public buyers petition for more bidders compared to publishing 
solicitations that invite competition (Kang & Miller, 2015). Thus, practitioners use 
information from bidders to make decisions related to competition in procurements and 
monitoring actions after contract awards. 
Leaders use agency theory to explore organizational issues (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
The central theme of agency theory is goal disagreement that consists of opposing 
objectives, risk tolerance levels, and separation of labor in contractual relationships 
(Sarhan et al., 2016). Principal and agent relationships conflict due to differences in 
goals, monitoring activities resulting in increased agency cost, and risk acceptance levels 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Further, agents may exploit relationships for their self-interest due to 
the perceptions of fairness (Bosse & Phillips, 2016). Agency theorists have declared that 
modern entrepreneurial organizations’ pursuit of competitive advantage creates new 
agency problems beyond opportunistic behavior (Bendickson et al., 2016). When agents 
withhold information, the principal needs to assess the value of the relationship that 
increases agency costs related to monitoring activities by the principal (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976).  
Agency theory is important to creating beneficial relationships that meet business 
and organizational goals. Three problems embody the key concepts of agency theory: (a) 
goal conflict, (b) information asymmetry, and (c) risk tolerance disparities 
(Bhattacherjee, 1998; Bøe et al., 2015). The key concepts of agency theory also include 
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(a) explaining the relationship between principals and agents, (b) conflicts of goals, (c) 
risk, and (d) contractual relationships. 
Principals and agents’ relationships. Researchers and practitioners use agency 
theory, especially management agency theory (Foss & Stea, 2014), to understand 
relationships between principals and agents in various organizational settings. Principal 
and agent conflicts originate from the Industrial Revolution (Bendickson et al., 2016). 
Researchers use the principal–agent model to explain the behaviors of the parties in 
business relationships when goal achievement by the principal depends on the agent’s 
actions toward meeting the interest of the principal (Bhattacherjee, 1998). Researchers 
use agency theory in two approaches: the positivist viewpoint and the principal and agent 
viewpoint (Eisenhardt, 1989). The positivist researcher focuses on large public 
organizations and seeks to understand the circumstances of the principal and agent’s 
conflicting goals that require instituting governance structures to restrict opportunistic 
behavior (Eisenhardt, 1989). The positivist researcher’s concerns are on governance 
structures versus solving principal–agent problems (Eisenhardt, 1989). Researchers use 
the principal and agent viewpoint to determine the right contract type that will generate 
the highest value from the relationship (Eisenhardt, 1989). Organizational leaders who 
contract with private industry to provide goods and services form principal and agent 
relationships. 
Researchers use agency theory to increase understanding of the dynamics of the 
principal and agent relationships. For example, Allen, George, and Davis (2018) utilized 
agency theory to investigate the role trust plays at the firm level in family firms. Agency 
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theorists have suggested that the firm provides the legal foundation for the principal and 
agent relationship (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The closeness in family firms increases 
the level of commitment, cooperation, and flexibility, and reduces transaction costs that 
improve performance outcomes (Allen et al., 2018). Le Breton-Miller, Miller, and Bares 
(2015) also postulated that researchers emphasize the aligning of the firm’s ownership 
with management goals while permitting owners to reduce agency costs through cost 
effective monitoring of agents. In the principal and agent’s relationship, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) asserted the agent will disregard the interest of the principal and seek to 
maximize their self-interested goals gained from the contractual agreement. But the 
principal and agent relationship becomes beneficial to both parties through the alignment 
of the objectives and the reduction of opportunistic behavior. 
Conflicts of goals. Agency theorists have claimed that a central purpose of 
agency theory is to help identify the exchange agreement that addresses opportunistic 
behavior that leads to conflicting goals (Tumbat & Grayson, 2016). The accomplishment 
of business objectives requires unity of goals between business owners and the managers 
hired to ensure business performance objectives. Conflicts between principals and agents 
occur when there is a separation of management and the ownership of a business (Yahya 
et al., 2016). Therefore, researchers use agency theory to minimize conflict between 
management and ownership in governance structures (Njuguna, 2016). Traditionally, 
agency theorists have concentrated on the separation of ownership and management 
structures aimed at increasing the possibility of limiting agency costs by monitoring 
agent’s activities by the principals (Allen et al., 2018). Conflicting goals burden the 
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agency relationship and result in increased cost associated with the principal monitoring 
the agent’s opportunistic behavior (Musau, 2015). Researchers apply the tenets of agency 
theory to minimize goal conflicts that occur in nonstandard governance structures, which 
disturbs principal and agent relationships.  
The conflicting goals of principals and agents magnify when the equilibrium of 
objectives in the relationship changes from a one-on-one relationship to a relationship 
with many actors. Agency theory generally applies to a singular viewpoint of the 
conflicting goals that occur when agents seek opportunistic behavior (Zardkoohi, 
Harrison, & Josefy, 2015). However, Hodari, Turner, and Sturman (2017) applied agency 
theory to agreements where there are a single agent and multiple principals in hotel 
operations. In hotel operations, the general manager is the agent who works to balance 
the conflicting goals of the principals that consist of the management company and the 
hotel ownership (Hodari et al., 2017). Further, small and medium enterprises establish 
single ownership and management structures that eliminate conflicting goals (Yahya et 
al., 2016). The success of organizations depends on the ability to achieve goal 
congruence by aligning the goals of the principal and the agent in an interconnected 
manner that allows achievement of the greatest value and organizational performance. 
Conflict in principal–agent relationships also consists of (a) agents behaving 
opportunistically against the principal interest, (b) principals behaving opportunistic 
against the interest of agents, and (c) partnerships between agents and principals to work 
toward opportunistic goals at the expense of society and stakeholders (Zardkoohi et al., 
2015). The ability to generate optimal business value relies on reducing the moral hazard 
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of self-interested behaviors, created by ex-ante and ex-post information irregularities 
(Steinle et al., 2014). Agency conflicts occur when agents hide information form 
principals that allow the agent to pursue goals opposite of those of the principal 
(Njuguna, 2016). Conversely, common goals foster collaborative relationships 
(Boukendour & Hughes, 2014). When all parties in the agency relationship understand 
and work toward a common goal, the areas of conflicts decreased, allowing value 
creation for the business. 
Businesses and organizations that fail to reduce conflicting goals and curve 
opportunistic behavior struggle to create value for stakeholders. Musau (2015) agreed 
with Le Breton-Miller et al. (2015) that conflicting goals between the principal and the 
agent resulted in increase monitoring costs for the principals resulting from a lack of trust 
in the relationship. Small and medium enterprises seeking financing from lenders might 
withhold information from the lenders, which creates conflict due to the lack of 
transparency and trust (Yahya et al., 2016). The arrangement of the family business 
where the agent holds an equity stake in the firm enables the agent to embrace the goals 
of the principals as their own (Bendickson et al., 2016). Bhattacherjee (1998) argued the 
use of varying levels of incentives to align the goals of the agents with those of the 
principals facilitates linking performance outcomes and the transferring of risk to the 
agent by the principal. 
Risk. The success of the principal and agent relationship relies on the risk 
tolerance of the parties in the relationship. In buyers and supplier’s relationships, buyers 
expect suppliers to contribute to the value offered to the customer by ensuring timely and 
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quality service delivery, whereas, the supplier that provides late distribution or poor-
quality products hinders the buyer’s ability to create value for their customers, and risk 
increases for the buyer’s business (Prosman, Scholten, & Power, 2016). Buyers with 
power over suppliers offer suppliers a choice of monitoring based or collaborative-based 
risk mitigation approaches with the goal of shifting the risk from principal to agent 
(Hajmohammad & Vachon, 2016). Auriol, Straub, and Flochel (2016) advocated in 
developing nations that lack the legal framework to enforce policies to prevent corruption 
promote risk in public procurement. Supporters of agency theory advised resolving 
conflicts between the principal and the agent occurs through the aligning of objectives 
using incentives to transfer risk to the agent (Prosman et al., 2016). Agency theorists 
declared supply chain managers gain an understanding of how to manage risk in supply 
chains and support the use of incentives to avoid supply issues (Prosman et al., 2016). 
The ability to manage risk determines an organization’s ability to generate value and 
achieve organizational success. 
Business leaders’ aptitude at controlling risk internally and externally influences 
the ability of principals and agents to align goals and create value for the organization. 
Agency theorists asserted sharing risk between principals and agents is a central 
assumption of agency theory that reduces agency problems caused when goals conflict 
and actors behave opportunistically (Bendickson et al., 2016). The differences in the level 
of risk tolerance between principals and agents exacerbate the conflict of principals and 
agent relationships (Biesenthal & Wilden, 2014). Boukendour and Hughes (2014) 
investigated risk in construction projects that separate the design component from the 
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actual construction project, which increases the risk for the project, especially when risk 
sharing is unfair. Le Breton-Miller et al. (2015) observed utilizing behavioral agency 
theory as a foundation that family owned businesses are risk averse and avoid risky 
endeavors opting instead to protect their current endowments. Agency theorists suggested 
several organizational approaches to managing the risk that includes (a) avoidance, (b) 
monitoring, (c) collaborating, or (d) acceptance of the risk (Hajmohammad & Vachon, 
2016). Researchers and practitioners combat the magnitude of risk on organizational 
performance through using the tenets of agency theory to comprehend individual risk 
tolerance of principals and agents that minimize opportunistic behavior. 
Business leaders pursue strategies that allow the cost effective monitoring and 
curtailing of opportunistic behavior through alliances and contracts that alter the behavior 
of agents and increase the principal risk bearing capacity. Carpintero and Petersen (2015) 
studied the ability of government agencies to transfer risk in public-private partnerships 
compared to transferring risk in traditional procurement methods. The risk bearing 
capacity differs from other governance models due to the ability to quantitatively fuse 
delivery systems, risk-sharing ratios, and insurance coverage (Chang, 2015). Public 
procurement officials balance the risk sharing capacity between public and private 
entities that account for information asymmetries before awarding contracts (Saussier & 
Tirole, 2015). Government agencies transfer the risk to private businesses in public, 
private partnership compared to retaining the risk in traditional procurement models 
(Carpintero & Petersen, 2015). Principals seek to share risk when information asymmetry 
is present that improves the level of contract accountability (Saussier & Tirole, 2015). 
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Researchers utilizing agency theory seek to determine the most efficient contract to use 
when the outcome is uncertain, risk tolerance differs, and an unbalance of information 
exist (Eisenhardt, 1989). When the objectives of principals and agents diverge along with 
risk inequities, the formation of agency problems arises that hinder performance and the 
contractual relationship. 
Contractual relationships. The ability to realize goal congruence between 
principals and agents rises through legal bonds that ensure accountability of the parties in 
the relationship. Jensen and Meckling (1976) proposed the development of contractual 
relationships form the foundation of value creations for firms. Researchers and 
practitioners held users of agency theory could determine the appropriate contract to 
mitigate conflict in principal and agent relationships through contract governance 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Agency theorists argued the use of agency theory is useful when 
contracting issues are difficult (Musau, 2015). The agency problem of goal incongruence, 
information asymmetry, and risk tolerance reduces when the parties establish a 
contractual relationship that includes incentives for the agent based on the outcome of the 
contract (Bhattacherjee, 1998). Jensen and Meckling (1976) agreed with Bhattacherjee 
(1998) in that using incentives in contracts reduces the opportunistic agent’s behavior and 
ensures performance aimed at maximizing the principal’s interest. The value of a 
contractual relationship is contingent on the ability to manage and transfer risk between 
principals and agents. 
Principals incur increased agency cost from administering contracts that require 
provisions and payment mechanisms aimed at controlling an agent’s potentially 
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fraudulent behavior. Eisenhardt (1989) observed outcome contracts work best when the 
agent is risk averse; therefore, measuring behavior becomes easy as the principal 
transfers risk to the agent. However, when the agent is prone to opportunistic behavior 
and the principal lacks information, the contract type is a behavior to combat the moral 
hazard of the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989). Principals add contract provisions to discourage 
noncompliance by the agents that might exceed the original requirements of the service 
contract (Peterson et al., 2015). Steinle et al. stressed the principal seeks to reduce risk by 
influencing the behavior of agents by establishing contractual relationships that include 
social controls that continue throughout the contract duration. Zardkoohi et al. (2015) 
argued that deceit is a human tendency that applies to principals and agents equally. 
Principals might act opportunistically by omitting provisions that protect the agent’s self-
interest resulting in contract breaches (Zardkoohi et al., 2015). Pepper and Gore (2015) 
asserted agency theory includes behavioral components that reimagine the model of man 
bounded rationally with consideration for loss, risk, and tradeoff concerning intrinsic and 
extrinsic rewards. Contractual relationships vary based on the level of risk tolerance of 
the principal and known opportunistic behavior tendencies of agents. 
Supporting Theories 
Bounded self-interest. Researchers and practitioners suggested principals and 
agents overcoming opportunism in principal and agent relationships occurs when the 
actors act with bounded self-interest. Bosse and Phillips (2016) argued in competitive 
environments, some agents display behavior influenced confined by the perception of 
fairness resulting in a bounded self-interest. Roach (2016) agreed with past researchers 
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that rationality relates to information asymmetry resulting in principals’ increased agency 
costs due to uncertainty and their bounded rationality aimed at monitoring the agents’ 
performance and behavior. A further agreement with Bosse and Phillips comes from 
including fairness to enhance understanding of agency theory application to governance. 
Researchers portrayed the principal and agent relationship as one bounded rationally with 
dependence on the division of contract risk tolerances and conflicting goals due to the 
principal’s lack of control over the agent (Aßländer et al., 2016). Researchers and 
practitioners argued reducing opportunism depends on the reciprocal perception of 
fairness and information equality between the contractual parties. 
Pouryousefi and Frooman (2017), in disagreement with Jones et al. (2016), noted 
that bounded self-interest is a natural assumption of agency theory. Researchers 
suggested game theory offers an alternative to agency theory by studying social conflicts 
of interests where players participate in a prisoner’s dilemma game that require rational 
players making strategic decisions to cooperate or defect the game (Soutschek, Sauter, & 
Schubert, 2015). In studying construction contracts, Boukendour and Hughes (2014) 
argued traditional procurement facilitated collaborative relationships despite goal 
incongruence and warned the parties might still pursue self-interested behaviors. Agency 
theorists claimed agents display a bounded self-interested behavior that adds a motivation 
to do the right thing component to the self-interest actions embedded in the original 
Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) application of agency theory (Bosse & Phillips, 2016). 
Principals and agents act with bounded self-interest to make decisions critical to 
achieving desired goals and maximizing value creation from the relationship. Agency 
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theorists introduced bounded self-interest and rationality to enhance agency theory 
compared to researchers that seek to replace or compete with agency theory. 
Transaction cost economics. Researchers and practitioners use various 
conceptual frameworks to understand governance structures that curve opportunism and 
goal conflicts while generating value. Researchers contended transaction cost economics 
is widely used to study organizations, strategic management, and governance structure 
selection (Ping, Levitt, Tsui, & Hsu, 2015). Yigitbasioglu (2014) asserted researchers 
focusing on trust and uncertainty in exchange relationships find transaction cost 
economics an ideal conceptual framework. Researchers and practitioners use transaction 
cost economics to help determine make or buy decisions and business capabilities 
required in strategic planning (Gulbrandsen, Lambe, & Sandvik, 2017). Ketokivi and 
Mahoney (2016) emphasized researchers and practitioners seeking to eliminate 
opportunism and reduce transaction costs employ transaction cost economics. Contractual 
relationships between principals and agents incur transaction costs from the development 
of the contract, negotiating the contract, and implementing the contract, which includes 
monitoring and control mechanisms (Peterson et al., 2015). Researchers and practitioners 
exploit transaction cost economics to lessen the influence of opportunistic behavior and 
to align organizational interest. 
The ability to develop productive relationships between buyers and suppliers 
allows organizations to achieve strategic objectives and competitive advantages. Ping et 
al. (2015) claimed when researchers and practitioners use transaction cost economics, 
they assume people are bounded rationally and opportunistic. Agency theorists agreed 
27 
 
that transaction cost economics shares similar assumptions concerning bounded 
rationality and opportunism; however, differ in economic viewpoints (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Eisenhardt (1989) submitted the focus of agency theorists is economic factors between 
cooperating actors, while transaction cost economists focus on organizational economic 
factors. Researchers focus is on the legal and government system that regulates credible 
transactions institutionally that reduces cost and risk (Bai, Sheng, & Li, 2016). 
Gulbrandsen et al. (2017) asserted transaction cost economists overlook supplier 
trustworthiness and dynamic capabilities of businesses in make or buy decisions, which 
limit transaction cost economics in contractual relationships. Researchers and 
practitioners argued transaction cost theory fails to curb opportunism by overlooking the 
social aspects of contractual relationships (Luo et al., 2015). A business understanding of 
contractual relationships and how to reduce self-interested behaviors requires 
understanding various conceptual frameworks to develop optimal contracts. 
Contract theory. Globally, researchers and practitioners define contractual 
relationships through the use of contracts that provide the legal foundation of binding 
agreements. Contract theorists maintained contract theory originated in the field of 
economics with an emphasis on comprehending financial exchanges (Brady, Li, & 
Yoder, 2015). Mirakhor, Ng, Dewandaru, and Hamid (2017) declared contract theorists 
dissect principal and agent conflicting interests resulting from the incompleteness of the 
contracts that both parties failed to ensure their interests and behaviors align. Contract 
theorists argued contracts are complete or incomplete with the latter influenced by ex-
post decisions of the parties (Wu, 2014). Brady et al. (2015) and Wu (2014) agreed that 
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exchanges in contractual relationships when following a complete contract approach 
necessitate accounting for all possible contingencies up front at contract formation. 
Further, agreement comes from Christensen, Nikolaev, and Wittenberg-Moerman (2016) 
who proclaimed the central tenet of contract theory is contracts are fundamentally 
incomplete because of principal and agents’ inability to predict or plainly define future 
behavior. Contract theorists who attempt to isolate all possibilities create an impracticable 
and incomplete contract.  
Researchers utilizing contract theory understand that the level of contract 
completeness is central to the effective use of contract theory (Brady et al., 2015; Zhang, 
Pan, Song, Dawy, & Han, 2017). Researchers concluded customarily contract theory 
mimics mainstream agent behavior with the agent choosing between economic 
advantages and decisions to perform or not perform (Brady et al., 2015). Zhang et al. 
(2017) discovered the use of incentives linked to performance might boost contract 
participation. Contract theorists asserted unless contracts include incentive structure 
forcing participants to work together, contracts become unachievable (Mirakhor et al., 
2017). In agreement, Wu (2014) argued contracts structures include incentives allowing 
eliminating information asymmetry problems like moral hazard and adverse selection. 
Agency theorists reasoned incentives eliminate conflicting interests when combined with 
outcome-based contracts (Eisenhardt, 1989). Researchers and practitioners explored other 
conceptual frameworks to understand the contractual relationship and investigated 




Stewardship theory. Researchers and practitioners utilize agency theory to 
resolve principal and agent relationships by resolving conflicting goals and reducing 
opportunism in the relationships. Bosse and Phillips (2016) offered bounded self-interest 
to enhance agency theory compared to researchers replacing agency theory with 
stewardship theory. Aßländer et al. (2016) professed that researchers and practitioners 
use stewardship theory to gain a different viewpoint to diminish opportunism and 
conflicting goals in principal and agent relationships. Researchers maintained agency 
theory and stewardship theories are derivatives of the concept of the modern man 
(Glinkowska & Kaczmarek, 2015). Madison, Holt, Kellermanns, and Ranft (2015) 
suggested researchers and practitioners struggle to apply agency theory to family 
businesses due to noneconomic goals and family involvement results in behavior and 
governance that are better suited for stewardship theory. Vallejo-Martos and Puentes-
Poyatos (2014) agreed with Madison et al. that applying stewardship theory to family 
owned businesses results in the steward’s willingness to work for the good of the family 
organization without consideration for their self-interest. Agency theorists warned 
researchers and practitioners that owners in family firms might use their power and 
knowledge to manipulate minority shareholders to redirect resources for narrow 
objectives that benefit the owners (Le Breton-Miller et al., 2015). Researchers argued 
agents act as stewards and work towards the interest of principals willingly without a 
desire to seek self-interest.  
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Researchers and practitioners use stewardship theory to align the agent’s interests 
with the interests of buyers in supply chains contractual relationships, resulting in 
increased trust and compliance (Aßländer et al., 2016). Stewardship theorists contended 
the motivation of agents as stewards to meet the terms and conditions of contracts occurs 
independently because of the alignment of self-interest with the objectives of the 
principals (Aßländer et al., 2016; Vallejo-Martos & Puentes-Poyatos, 2014). The findings 
of stewardship theorists contrast with Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) argument that agents 
who remain bounded by self-interest restrict the agents or stewards’ interests. 
Glinkowska and Kaczmarek (2015) advised agency theorists encounter rational 
individuals attempting to maximize their self-interest compared to stewardship theorists’ 
focus on management’s desire to achieve business objectives versus self-interest 
behaviors. Researchers and practitioners contrast the themes of stewardship theory and 
agency theory to determine how to reduce goal conflicts. 
The control mechanism principals use to monitor and direct the agent’s behavior 
towards the interest of the principal conflict with the independence stewards’ experience 
under stewardship theory (Aßländer et al., 2016). Vallejo-Martos and Puentes-Poyatos 
agreed with Aßländer et al. (2016) in that the use of stewardship theory is a means for 
researchers and practitioners to eliminate costly monitoring and control mechanisms. 
Klay (2015) maintained federal contracting officers follow procurement laws to add 
control mechanism in contracts and to curve vendors (agent) self-interest tendencies. 
Public agencies that enter into contractual relationships aimed at securing goods and 
services with public funds must exercise caution when assuming vendors and managers 
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are stewards in their behaviors. Stewardship theorists focus on the manager’s ability to 
identify with the organization, adopting organizational objectives as their own, and the 
manager’s motivation to perform duties toward accomplishing organizational objectives 
(Aßländer et al., 2016). Glinkowska and Kaczmarek (2015) upheld organizations 
discover the use of motivators to align the agent’s interests with the interests of the 
organization becomes unnecessary when applying a stewardship theory approach. 
Practitioners use incentives to motivate stewards to align their interests with the 
organization which eliminates costly monitoring. 
Researchers and practitioners cautioned, in contractual relationships, principals 
and agents might exhibit behaviors ascribed to agency theory and stewardship theory that 
requires users to establish a comprehensive foundation of both theories (Snippert, 
Witteveen, Boes, & Voordijk, 2015). Schneider (2015) proposed in risk environments 
faced by businesses, stewardship theory lacks the foundation to address risk challenges. 
Snippert et al. (2015) questioned stewardship theory’s appropriateness in contractual 
relationships when buyers and suppliers must align interests to generate the best value. 
Agency theorists disputed the mutual respect and trust focus of stewardship theory to 
generate value for stakeholders compared to agency theory’s use of monitoring and 
control to create value for stakeholders (Aßländer et al., 2016). Opponents of stewardship 
theory stated the best value approach is a procurement and project management tool 
designed to obtain the best value for goods and services while paying the lowest cost 
(Snippert et al., 2015). Another opposing view of stewardship theory researchers 
highlighted is the limited focus of the theory to particular stakeholders which shows the 
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theory lacks the capacity to reappropriate risk (Schneider, 2015). Critics of stewardship 
theory suggested principals revert to the normal tendency to control and monitor agents 
which contradicts the best value approach (Snippert et al., 2015). Organizational leaders 
seek agreements that allow maximization of competitive advantages while permitting 
control and alignment of objectives to increase value.  
Resource-based theory. Researchers and practitioners use the resource-based 
theory to highlight a business’s ability to gain and maintain competitive advantage 
depending on the use of resources (Battisti & Williamson, 2015). Researchers suggested 
resource based theory is a critical structure that explains and predicts a business’s 
competitive advantage and performance through the business’s accumulation of valuable, 
unique, and unduplicatable resources (Hitt, Xu, & Carnes, 2016). Le Breton-Miller et al. 
(2015) maintained family businesses with entrepreneurial behavior will stockpile 
resources and capabilities allowing survival of the business during periods of uncertainty, 
inactivity, and innovation for the next generation of family owners. Researchers and 
practitioners explained the resource based theory requires businesses to incentivize 
employees and other stakeholders that motivate firm specific investments used to 
cultivate the resources and capabilities used for competitive advantage (Hoskisson, 
Gambeta, Green, & Li, 2018). Researchers and practitioners contended business leaders 
exploit their unique resources to achieve advantages over competitors. 
Battisti and Williamson (2015) held small business’s competitive advantage 
resides with owners and managers requiring the use of intermediaries to develop the 
resources to develop and sustain competitive advantage. Agency theorists implied 
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resource based theory’s reliance on intermediaries permits managing some of the risks 
and information asymmetries in principal and agent relationships (Battisti & Williamson, 
2015). Van Rijnsoever, Kempkes, and Chappin (2017) argued researchers and 
practitioners use resource based theory traditionally to understand the resources within a 
business; however recently emphasis on partnerships outside of the business gained 
attention. Small businesses and family firms seeking competitive advantages discover 
resource based theory limits their ability to achieve objectives without help from agency 
theory or other theoretical foundations. 
Game theory. The success of contractual relationships depends on the quality of 
decision making between buyers and suppliers that ensure the optimal business strategy 
allowing the optimal benefit. Schmidt (2015) maintained public procurement is a formal 
process with strict laws governing decision making. Researchers used game theory to 
contend with conflict of interest and to support cooperative decision making (Soutschek 
et al., 2015). Samuelson (2016) discussed how researchers and practitioners consider 
game theory a model to investigate individual behaviors grouped to study complex 
phenomena. Researchers and practitioners apply game theory to public procurement to 
explain the behaviors of tenderers’ decisions on bid price when considering competitors 
(Schmidt, 2015). Practitioners using game theory resist conflicting interests through 
decisions that accommodate the interest of all parties in the contractual relationship. 
Budde and Minner (2015) expressed service providers encounter various games 
for countless procurement opportunities which permits alternative strategies. Soutschek et 
al. (2015) outlined game theory as a competition that offers four possible outcomes that 
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include the outcome of cooperation between the players. Schmidt (2015) alleged each 
player in the game seeks the optimal strategic decision based on the information available 
to establish Nash equilibrium. Samuelson (2016) disagreed with Schmidt and argued that 
games include several equilibria, which agreed with Budde and Minner. Game theorists 
exploit game theory to support the discovery of optimal contract pricing (Moradi, 
Abedini, & Hosseinian, 2016). Researchers and practitioners utilize game theory to help 
understand the diversity of procuring goods and services at the best value.  
Application to Business Practice 
Small businesses fail to win open competitive federal contracts despite policies 
directing U. S. federal agencies to use open competitive procedures designed to increase 
small business participation in federal contracting (FAR, 2016a). Small business 
advocates contended the Small Business Act requires federal agencies to ensure 
procurements are competitive which help secure the nation’s economic stability 
(Shoraka, 2014). Chever et al. (2017) offered federal buyers purposely restrict 
competition opting to negotiate with a single supplier. The European Commission 
reported increasing small and medium business participation in public procurement 
through competition creates economic value and promotes job creation (Saastamoinen, 
Reijonen, & Tammi, 2017). Lamothe (2014) indicated competition reduces information 
asymmetries and promotes agents to submit bids closer to actual production cost. 
Government buyers embed monitoring and control instruments in public procurement 
opportunities while promoting competition to increase small business participation. 
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Competition. Supporters of competition in federal contracting advocate that 
competition reduces costs and add value for the purchasers of goods and service. 
Lamothe (2014) suggested federal procurement buyers define fair competition as 
procurement with at least three acceptable bidders. In contrast, Kang and Miller (2015) 
argued most federal procurements include weak competition and contracts awards usually 
occur with one bidder. Further disagreement with the contribution to procurement from 
adopting competitive procedures comes from Krivda and Bogart’s (2014) assertion the 
requirements of the Competition in Contracting Act hinders federal agencies in the 
United States from procuring efficient information technology. Correa and Ornaghi 
(2014) maintained the benefits of competition dates back to Adam Smith and promotes 
reduced costs, manufacturing efficiency, and increased innovation. Government buyers 
utilize the Competition in Contracting Act and other procurement policies to include 
competition in procurement actions permitting inclusion of small businesses in the 
process.  
The addition of small businesses in public procurement through competitive 
procedures finds opposition from researchers and practitioners. Reis and Cabral (2015) 
claimed there are uncertainties related to competition and the government’s ability to 
attain economies because small business inclusion discourages larger and more efficient 
businesses from participating in public procurement. Competition supporters maintained 
public procurement must include qualification standards that allow participation from 
qualified candidates while generating adequate competition for the procurement (Hanák 
& Muchová, 2015). Reis and Cabral expressed the belief that small businesses are less 
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capable but dominate competitive public procurement which increases contracting costs 
for governments. However, the evidence supporting increased competition on the 
variances in what the government expects to pay versus the actual contract award price 
emphasizes the need for public agencies to use open competitive procedures (Hanák & 
Muchová, 2015). Albano, Cesi, and Iozzi (2017) asserted public buyers use of open 
competitive procurement procedures promotes awarding contracts to the most efficient 
business in the market. Researchers and practitioners declared the use of competitive 
methods in public procurement allows the government to achieve value and lower market 
prices for goods and services. 
Public procurement policy. Public agencies around the world use policies to 
increase small business participation in public procurement and to realize social 
objectives. Grandia and Meehan (2017) maintained public agencies use public 
procurement to accomplish social goals such as minimizing long-term unemployment, 
improving working conditions, promoting innovation, and increasing participation for 
small and medium enterprises. Researchers asserted government agencies design policies 
to increase small business participation in public procurement that is straightforward; 
however, problems arise when public buyers fail to adhere to the policies (Flynn & 
Davis, 2016b). Borowiec (2017) championed developing public procurement systems 
that include all participants without increasing agency cost. Researchers and practitioners 
determined, despite standardize policies to increase small business participation in public 
procurements, small businesses face entry barriers. Researchers and practitioners 
understand the contributions of small businesses to a nation’s economy; therefore, 
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increasing access to public procurement programs that allow open competitive tendering 
determines the success of policies.  
Government agencies utilize procurement policies to increase competition and to 
eliminate obstacles that prevent or reduce small business participation in public 
procurement. Saastamoinen et al. (2017) argued small businesses experience various 
barriers despite inclusion policies that hinder active participation in public procurement 
that range from lack of adequate knowledge to limited performance capacity. Researchers 
claimed public buyers create barriers that prevent small businesses from participation 
through deliberate acts of improperly evaluating bids (Hanák & Muchová, 2015). 
Researchers explained small businesses experience issues participating in public 
procurement due to a lack of knowledge about tendering opportunities (Loader & Norton, 
2015; Saastamoinen et al., 2017). Small business leaders experience barriers that prevent 
inclusion in public procurement that reduces competitiveness. 
Public procurement process. Government agencies at the local, state and 
national levels use contracts to meet the needs of citizens through the economical 
acquisition of goods and services. Georghiou et al. (2014) argued public procurement 
accounts for a large portion of the demands for goods and services around the world. 
Researchers explained public procurement links political and policy to economic growth, 
social inclusion, and environmental sustainability (Flynn & Davis, 2014). Budde and 
Minner (2015) suggested private and public agencies use reverse auctions to purchase 
services resulting in lower procurement costs. Public buyers conduct auctions under 
public scrutiny that requires supplying all information to suppliers before the start of the 
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auction (Gretschko & Wambach, 2016). Grandia and Meehan (2017) maintained 
insufficient information about the factors of success and efficiency is available related to 
public procurements and the conflicting goals embedded into the process. Agency 
theorists contend when public buyers as principals lack information, the use of a behavior 
contract to combat moral hazards of agents is common (Eisenhardt, 1989). Agents 
promote the cost effective procurement of goods and services through sharing adequate 
information.  
Public agencies use preference programs and specific evaluation criteria to align 
the goals and reduce moral hazards in public procurement. Public buyers use their 
discretionary power when selecting businesses for participation in public procurement 
tendering (Chever et al., 2017). Reis and Cabral (2015) discussed the use of preference 
programs that either restrict participation to small businesses only or preferred 
businesses. Researchers and practitioners determined public buyers use a discriminatory 
competition process that selects suppliers based on price and past performance to 
improve contract award efficiency (Albano et al., 2017). Sumo, Valk, Weele, and 
Duysters (2016) claimed contracts represent a method of mitigating hazards created by 
the opportunistic behavior of agents. Agency theorists recommended designing public 
procurement programs that require public buyers to select suppliers from multiple agents 
to reduce information asymmetries and adverse selection (Bhattacherjee, 1998). Public 
buyers embed monitoring and control terms and conditions in contracts to curve 




In Section 1, I introduced the study and provided the background of the problem. I 
proceeded to identify the problem, the purpose of the study, the nature of the study, and 
the central research question that I used to guide this research study. Section 1 included 
interview questions that link to the central research question of this study. Section 1 
included the conceptual framework, definitions, assumptions, limitations, delimitations, 
and the significance of the study in which I addressed the potential benefits to the 
business community and impact on social change. Section 1 concluded with a 
comprehensive review of relevant professional and academic literature. In Section 2, I 
explain the role of the researcher, participant criteria, and an outline of the research 
methods and design. I discuss the data collection, organization, and analysis procedures, 
and the actions undertaken to ensure dependable, credible findings. In Section 3, I present 
the findings of my study. Further, Section 3 contains an analysis of the data, applications 




Section 2: The Project 
Introduction 
In Section 2, I restate the purpose statement of this qualitative multiple case study, 
explain my role within the research, and discuss the eligibility criteria for participants. I 
also describe the research method and design. Additionally, I discuss population and 
sampling, ethical research, data collection, data analysis, and reliability and validity.  
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this qualitative multiple case study was to explore strategies some 
small business leaders in the service industry use to win full and open competitive U.S. 
federal contracts. The targeted population was small business leaders in six service 
industry companies located in the state of Washington who successfully implemented 
strategies to win open competitive U.S. federal contracts. The implications for positive 
social change included the potential for improved local job creation, local economic 
stability, and lower local unemployment. Improved local job creation, lower 
unemployment, and greater local economic activity occurs when small business owners 
win U.S. federal contracts (Doucet & Lee, 2014; Karadag, 2015; Reijonen et al., 2016; 
Walker & Preuss, 2008). 
Role of the Researcher 
The role of the researcher in qualitative research is to serve as the primary data 
collection instrument (Cope, 2014; Fusch & Ness, 2015; Yin, 2018). I was the primary 
data collection instrument for this study. Qualitative researchers also conduct face-to-face 
interviews to explain meaning and to confirm interpretations while asking follow-up 
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questions and observing nonverbal behavior (Mayoh & Onwuegbuzie, 2015). I conducted 
face-to-face interviews with follow-up questions and observed nonverbal behavior to 
collect data. The researcher’s background, locale, and association might influence the 
recruitment of participants and the results; therefore, researchers’ acknowledgments of 
biases limit the impact on study participation and findings (Robinson, 2014). As the 
primary data collection instrument, my experience in soliciting, evaluating, negotiating, 
and awarding federal government contracts influenced my role as the researcher. The 
qualitative researcher exemplifies ethics in their actions to protect participants by not 
pressuring and applying unwarranted encouragement to participants in research 
(Bromley, Mikesell, Jones, & Khodyakov, 2015). I protected participants by ensuring no 
unwarranted encouragement or coercion occurred in my research study. 
The Belmont Report’s main principles include autonomy, beneficence, and justice 
(Yearby, 2016). The role of researchers is to ensure that the identification and depiction 
of participants are truthful (Elo et al., 2014). Researchers protect participants ensuring the 
participants are knowledgeable of the research process and their right to voluntarily 
consent to participate (Robinson, 2014). I protected participants by obtaining informed 
consent before conducting interviews. I followed the principles of the Belmont Report 
when conducting interviews and throughout the research study to ensure full protection of 
study participants. Researchers hinder data collection when they insert their worldview 
and biases, which may influence the way they ask questions, interpret meaning, and 
shape findings (Berger, 2015). As the primary data collector, I recognized and identified 
my biases to ensure data collection was trustworthy and to provide protection of research 
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participants. Qualitative researchers may also conduct self-evaluations and internal 
dialogues of their bias to acknowledge how biases may affect the research process as a 
processed term reflexivity (Berger, 2015). A method of reflexivity used by qualitative 
researchers is bracketing, which allows researchers to acknowledge their past 
backgrounds and suspend any personal biases that might influence the study (Kuntz, 
Seitz, & Nelson, 2015; Sorsa, Kiikkala, & Astedt-Kurki, 2015). I used bracketing to 
acknowledge and mitigate any potential personal biases in this study. 
Finally, my role as the researcher included being an interviewer. Qualitative 
researchers develop a collection of questions that are open-ended that allow them to 
explore the phenomenon with participants freely expressing their insights without the 
limitations of close-ended questions (Chenail, 2011). Additionally, qualitative researchers 
who write down their thoughts before and after conducting interviews in a journal lessen 
biases in addition to using the interviewing-the-investigator method (Chenail, 2011). 
Researchers also use an interview protocol to establish the method of investigation by 
outlining the procedures and strategies used by researchers to conduct interviews (Dikko, 
2016; Yin, 2018). Furthermore, researchers use an interview protocol to elicit detailed 
information related to the purpose of the study and as a method to start a conversation 
about a phenomenon (Castillo-Montoya, 2016). I used an interview protocol to gain 
consistency throughout the interview process that ensured fairness for all participants and 




Researchers select participants for qualitative studies who understand the 
phenomenon under investigation and can provide new ideas and themes related to the 
central question of the study (Boddy, 2016). The eligibility criteria for this study are (a) 
small businesses leaders seeking federal contracts, (b) leaders who implemented 
successes strategies to win federal contracts, and (c) small business leaders located in the 
state of Washington. Business leaders include CEOs, members of a board of directors, 
and a member of an upper management team who influence the organizational structure, 
revenue-generating ability, and the sustainability of the business through strategic 
decision-making related to how and when the business makes decisions (Simsek, Jansen, 
Minichilli, & Escriba-Esteve, 2015). The participants consisted of small business leaders 
of service companies that include CEOs, presidents, general managers, and business 
owners who implemented strategies to win open competitive U.S. federal contracts. I 
used the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG) to access small 
businesses leaders in the service industry who received open competitive federal 
contracts awards in the state of Washington. The FPDS-NG database includes federal 
acquisitions with the dollar value of the contract award, the product or service code, 
contractor name, competition requirements, the place of performance for the goods or 
service, and if the contractor is a small business (Moore, Grammich, & Mele, 2015). I 




Qualitative researchers develop positive relationships with participants to build 
trust, respect, and to establish working relationships (Vallano & Schreiber Compo, 2015), 
and the ability to establish a bond with study participants is essential in qualitative 
research (Dikko, 2016). I used an interview protocol to develop a relationship with the 
participants (see Appendix). Qualitative researchers also improve the creditability of their 
study by building a rapport with participants that encourages honest disclosure and 
willingness to share information (Yin, 2018). I established rapport by personally visiting 
the small businesses selected from the FPDS-NG to invite them to participate in this 
study. During my visit with the small business leaders, I explained the purpose of my 
study and explained confidentiality and the informed consent form process required for 
voluntary participation in the study. Lastly, I asked to interview potential participants to 
understand the successful strategies they have used to win open competitive U.S. federal 
contracts.  
Research Method and Design  
Research Method 
Three primary research methods exist: qualitative, quantitative, and mixed 
methods (Almalki, 2016; Groeneveld, Tummers, Bronkhorst, Ashikali, & van Thiel, 
2015; McCusker & Gunaydin, 2015). I used the qualitative research method to gain a 
deeper understanding of the strategies some small business leaders use to win open 
competitive U.S. federal contracts. In qualitative research, the researcher explores the 
meaning of phenomenon through exploration, information, evaluation, and interpretation 
(Ejimabo, 2015; Sutton & Austin, 2015). Researchers use qualitative methods to collect 
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open-ended, developing data used to create themes (Sutton & Austin, 2015). The central 
focus of researchers using the qualitative method is to explore a phenomenon from the 
viewpoints of participants in the context in which the participants experience the 
phenomenon (Ejimabo, 2015). Qualitative researchers conduct in-depth interviews using 
how and why questions to elicit understanding of the phenomenon of the study (Lewis, 
2015). The researcher takes a snapshot of participants’ insights in natural settings (Sutton 
& Austin, 2015). Qualitative researchers can gain a deeper understanding of decisions or 
processes and use thick descriptions to explain, analyze, and understand participants’ 
viewpoints (Yin, 2018). A concern of the qualitative researcher is acquiring a level of 
realism from participants not possible in quantitative research (Muylaert, Sarubbi, Gallo, 
Neto, & Reis, 2014), but I acquired this realism through thick descriptions of 
participants’ viewpoints.  
Researchers conducting quantitative research emphasize numerical data and 
testing hypotheses to determine relationships or differences between variables (Ingham-
Broomfield, 2014; Sutton & Austin, 2015). This can mean that quantitative researchers 
are distant from the phenomenon under study and enter the study with preconceived ideas 
of the findings (McCusker & Gunaydin, 2015). In the use of the quantitative approach, 
researchers also focus on testing theories using scientific methods (Antwi & Hamza, 
2015) and emphasize causation and correlation to establish a statistically significant 
relationship (Ingham-Broomfield, 2014). My focus was not to test theories or use 
scientific processes; therefore, the quantitative research method did not meet the 
objective of this study. 
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Combining elements of qualitative research methods and quantitative research 
methods result in a mixed method (Landrum & Garza, 2015). Researchers use mixed 
methods to link the strengths of qualitative and quantitative methods while compensating 
for the limitation of both methods (Kaur, 2016). In the use of the mixed-method 
approach, researchers seek answers to complex questions (McCusker & Gunaydin, 2015). 
Additionally, mixed-method researchers seek to understand a phenomenon while 
measuring trends, causes, and effects (Kaur, 2016). I rejected the use of the mixed-
method approach because I was not testing hypotheses or seeking to understand the cause 
and effect common in quantitative methods while I explored the strategies used by some 
small business leaders in the service industry used to win open competitive U.S. federal 
contracts. 
Research Design 
A research design is the reasoning used by the researcher to connect the data and 
results to the central research question of the study (Yin, 2018). I selected a case study 
design for this study. A case study design is a realistic process that allows the use of 
various approaches and information sources to achieve insight of the phenomenon 
studied (Doody & Doody, 2015; Yin, 2018). Case study research was appropriate for this 
study because I sought to explore a phenomenon in a real-life, bounded setting using 
multiple data sources. Researchers conducting multiple case studies examine each 
participant’s narratives of their real-life experiences and perspectives (Uiboleht, Karm, & 
Postareff, 2016). I used a multiple case study to explore successful strategies some small 
business service leaders used to win open competitive federal contracts.  
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Phenomenological researchers explore the meanings of lived experiences of 
participants (Mayoh & Onwuegbuzie, 2015). Phenomenological researchers focus on the 
internal thoughts, viewpoints, opinions, outlooks, and structures of the thinking processes 
and not the factors that cause the cognitive process (Percy, Kostere, & Kostere, 2015). 
Researchers conducting a phenomenological study emphasize the accurate experiences of 
the study as more important than the ability of the researcher to relate the finding across 
other studies or people (Marshall & Rossman, 2016). I did not choose a 
phenomenological design because I was not exploring the lived experiences of small 
business service leaders.  
A business researcher uses ethnographic research to study a phenomenon of a 
culture or group (Draper, 2015). Ethnographic researchers study social groups that 
require the researcher to develop a closeness with the participants and happenings to 
generate thick accounts of the phenomena (Liao, Soltani, Wang, & Iqbal, 2017). 
Researchers using the ethnographic design highlight the influences of conduct and 
interfaces to discovery inside meaning related to a phenomenon (Eika, Dale, Espnes, & 
Hvalvik, 2015). My study interest was the successful strategies of individual small 
business service leaders, not the collective group; therefore, the use of ethnographic 
research design was inappropriate for this study.  
The narrative researcher chronicles the life stories of participants (Singh et al., 
2015). Researchers using narrative designs seek a chronological order that binds events in 
a significant manner to provide understanding of a phenomenon (Sahni & Sinha, 2016). 
Narrative researchers contemplate the entire storyline related to the relationship between 
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the presenter’s experiences and the dual construction of meaning of the presenter and the 
researcher through a social context (Dumay & Rooney, 2016). The use of narrative 
design for this study was not appropriate because I was not studying the life stories of 
participants.  
Another consideration in my research design was data saturation. Data saturation 
occurs when no new themes or data are obtained and there are enough data for replication 
of the study by others (Fusch & Ness, 2015; Houghton, Casey, Shaw, & Murphy, 2013). 
Saturation builds rich data within the conceptual framework of the study by exploring all 
sides of the phenomenon repeats among study participants (Morse, 2015b). Conducting 
interviews is one method researchers use to achieve data saturation in qualitative research 
(Fusch & Ness, 2015) that can pair with member checking to ensure data saturation (Birt, 
Scott, Cavers, Campbell, & Walter, 2016). Member checking allows the researcher to 
return a summary of the transcribed interview to participants that allow validation of the 
trustworthiness of the data (Birt et al., 2016). I conducted semistructured interviews to 
ask follow-up probing questions to elicit rich data, and I used member checking to ensure 
data saturation. Data saturation also helped the results of this study, as the optimal 
outcome of a multiple case study depends on prior knowledge by the researcher on how 
and why a result of the cases might occur from case to case (Yin, 2018). I conducted 
interviews with business leaders in the service industry who have successfully used 




Population and Sampling 
Qualitative researchers select data informants to collect the data required to 
address the study objective (Gentles, Charles, Ploeg, & McKibbon, 2015). Qualitative 
researchers use purposeful sampling to identify and select data rich cases linked to the 
phenomenon of the study (Duan, Bhaumik, Palinkas, & Hoagwood, 2015; Palinkas et al., 
2015). Purposeful sampling is appropriate when researchers are interested in participants 
who have firsthand knowledge of the phenomenon (Elo et al., 2014). Purposeful 
sampling allows researchers to limit a larger population down to a smaller sample 
population based on participants’ experience related to the topic of the study (Etikan, 
2016; Palinkas et al., 2015). Researchers use purposeful samplings to select participants 
who meet specific criteria and who have knowledge of the phenomenon explored in the 
study instead of selecting participants based on convenience (Benoot, Hannes, & Bilsen, 
2016; Etikan, 2016). Researchers’ use of snowball sampling will potentially allow one 
participant to know who subsequent participants are and violates confidentiality of study 
participants (Yingling & McClain, 2015). I used purposeful sampling to select small 
business leaders who have successfully used strategies to win open competitive U.S. 
federal contracts. Small business leaders include CEOs, presidents, general managers, 
and business owners with the authority to make decisions that affect revenue generation 
and business operations (Simsek et al., 2015). To be eligible for this study, participants 
had to have been leaders who (a) sought federal contracts, (b) implemented successful 
strategies to win federal contracts, and (c) be located in the state of Washington. 
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Determining the optimal sample size for qualitative studies depends on the 
purpose of the study, central research question, and the depth of the data (Elo et al., 
2014). The sampling size for multiple case studies is effective at six to 10 case studies 
(Yin, 2018). The sample size for my study was six small business leaders in the state of 
Washington. Akindoju (2016) explored small business strategies in Halifax, Nova Scotia 
and used a sample size of six small business leaders. Asoh (2016) conducted a qualitative 
multiple case study of small business owners using a sample size of six small business 
owners. Roman (2016) studied strategies to control internal factors affecting information 
systems projects with the telecommunication service industry, using six participants as 
the sample size. Because my study was similar in method, design, and scope to the 
research of Akindoju, Asoh, and Roman, six participants was an appropriate sample size. 
Data saturation occurs when the qualitative researcher collects no new data or 
themes signaling to the researcher that the sample size is sufficient (Fusch & Ness, 2015). 
In qualitative research, data saturation occurs when no new data applicable to the purpose 
of the study is obtainable (Kasim & Al-Gahuri, 2015). Morse (2015b) maintained 
saturation builds rich data within the conceptual framework of the study by exploring all 
sides of the phenomenon repeats among study participants. Collecting data from a variety 
of participants to gain different viewpoints and to validate data refers to data triangulation 
(Fusch & Ness, 2015). I used semistructured interviews to collect rich data during 
interviews and verified data saturation by using member checking. The optimal outcome 
of a multiple case study depends on prior knowledge by the researcher as how and why a 
result of the cases might occur from case to case (Yin, 2018). I conducted interviews of 
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six business leaders in the service industry until the information provided by the 
participants became redundant or no new data appeared.  
The interview site must be convenient for the participants to ensure their 
involvement in the study (Darwin et al., 2017). After obtaining informed consent, 
participants may select an interview location that is suitable for them and their schedules 
(Darwin et al., 2017; Thorneloe, Bundy, Griffiths, Ashcroft, & Cordingley, 2017). 
Researchers must ensure the interview location is secure, safe, quiet, and free from 
interruption (Doody & Noonan, 2013). To facilitate the participants selecting a location 
that was private and convenient, I suggested a publicly available site, such as a library or 
community center, depending on the availability. 
Ethical Research 
Qualitative researchers must obtain informed consent from participants before 
conducting research (Lorell, Mikita, Anderson, Hallinan, & Forrest, 2015). Acquiring 
informed consent from participants increases participants’ trust that the researcher will 
protect their information (Pacho, 2015). Informed consent is a means for competent 
participants to agree or disagree to participate in the research voluntarily (Pacho, 2015). 
Qualitative researchers ensure there is a balance of the benefits of the research and the 
potential harm to the research participants (Roberts, 2015). Researchers should inform 
potential participants of the purpose of the study, note that participation is voluntary, 
provide the steps required to protect their information, describe the type of questions in 
the interview, and review the requirement for Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval 
before conducting the study (Robinson, 2014). I visited participants and provided them 
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with an invitation to participate and provided a copy of the informed consent form to 
study participants, which contains content regarding participation in this study was 
voluntary and that they could withdraw from the study at any time. 
Researchers must inform participants that they have the right to decline to 
participate in the study, and they can quit at any time without the need for a reason 
(Pacho, 2015). Participants may withdraw from the research study if they feel 
apprehensive or troubled (Doyle & Buckley, 2016). Qualitative researchers must inform 
participants of their right to withdraw and refuse to answer specific questions (Sabar & 
Ben-Yehoshua, 2017). I informed study participants of their right to refuse to answer 
certain questions and their right to withdraw from the study at any time without 
repercussions. Researchers must obtain IRB written approval before conducting the study 
and interviews (Wiehle et al., 2014). I obtained approval from Walden University’s IRB 
prior to conducting the study. The Walden University IRB approval number is 09-27-18-
0104252. 
Another ethical issue qualitative researchers must address is the use of incentives 
that may stimulate participants, but cause distress (Robinson, 2014). I did not offer any 
incentives to participants, monetary or otherwise for participating in this study. I provided 
study participants with a PDF copy of the published study. Qualitative researchers must 
follow the principles of the Belmont report of autonomy and protection to ensure the 
confidentiality of participants’ names and businesses (Fiske & Hauser, 2014). 
Researchers experience ethical issues when conducting interviews (Petrova, Dewing, & 
Camilleri, 2016). Ethical issues include the protection of participants from mental or 
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emotional harm and safeguarding private and confidential information shared by the 
participants (Fiske & Hauser, 2014). The researcher may use different methods to 
preserve participant confidentiality, such as using aliases or codes, when analyzing the 
data (Petrova et al., 2016). I replaced study participants’ identifying information with the 
codes P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, and P6 to protect their identities. I saved all data on a password-
protected flash drive and locked the flash drive in a secure file cabinet in my home office. 
I will retain all research records for 5 years, after which time I will destroy the flash drive 
and shred the paper documents.  
Data Collection Instruments 
Researchers conducting qualitative research are the primary data collection 
instruments (Cope, 2014; Fusch & Ness, 2015; Yin, 2018). As the researcher, I was the 
primary data collection instrument for this study. Qualitative researchers utilize various 
data collection instruments that might include questionnaires, field notes, observation, 
reflective journaling, focus groups, archival records, documents, physical artifacts, and 
semistructured interviews (Cope, 2014; Nassaji, 2015; Yin, 2018). The most dominant 
data collection instrument qualitative researchers employ is the interview; especially 
when conducting case study research (Yin, 2018). The majority of qualitative research 
interviews are in-depth and semistructured (Wethington & McDarby, 2015). I acted as 
the primary data collection instrument and used semistructured interviews along with 
reviewing company documents for this study. 
In qualitative research, the use of semistructured interviews provide researchers 
with a flexible and accommodating data collection tool useable in individual and group 
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interview settings (Kallio, Pietila, Johnson, & Kangasniemi, 2016). Researchers use 
semistructured interviews to ask open-ended questions that provide participants the 
freedom to answer questions without feeling pressure from the researcher (Kallio et al., 
2016). Researchers pose each interview question to participants in the same way that 
follow an exact order, but the researcher has the option to deviate from the planned 
question order based on the participant’s responses (McIntosh & Morse, 2015; 
Wethington & McDarby, 2015). I used semistructured interviews that follow the 
interview protocol (see Appendix) to collect data for this study. I used semistructured 
interviews to ask probing questions and follow-up questions that enhanced my ability to 
gather additional information and clarification from the participants.  
Qualitative researchers use documents to validate and supplement evidence 
collected from other sources (De Massis & Kotlar, 2014; Yin, 2018). Researchers use 
multiple data sources to triangulate and examine the same phenomenon from various 
perspectives (De Massis & Kotlar, 2014; Houghton et al., 2013). Qualitative researchers 
might use documents to contradict or collaborate information gathered from interviews 
(Yin, 2018). Yin (2018) listed several types of relevant documents that researchers might 
review during data collection that include e-mails, administrative documents, letters, 
reports, proposals, and other internal documents. I collected company documents that 
included contracts awards, contract proposals, and statement of work used to outline 
business strategies used to win open competitive federal contracts. I gained access to the 
company documents through an authorized official of each company signing a letter of 
cooperation and confidentiality agreement. 
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Qualitative researchers establish trustworthiness by ensuring the data collection is 
dependable, credible, confirmable, and transferable (Morse, 2015a). Researchers use 
methodological triangulation to gather data using multiple data collection instruments 
during data collection to attain a complete view of the phenomenon (Cope, 2014). The 
use of multiple data sources in qualitative research improves consistency and credibility 
in the data collection (De Massis & Kotlar, 2014; Singh, 2015). In a qualitative approach, 
researchers use triangulation to confirm the data, ensure the data is extensive, and 
enhance credibility (Houghton et al., 2013). Qualitative researchers utilize member 
checking to confirm the accuracy of findings (Fusch & Ness, 2015) and during data 
collection to verify data between participants (Morse, 2015a). I used an interview 
protocol (see Appendix), methodological triangulation, and member checking to ensure 
dependability, credibility, and confirmability in this study. I transcribed the recorded 
interviews, composed a summary page of the interview data, and provide the interpreted 
summary to the participants via e-mail three days before the 30-minute, member-
checking meeting. During the member checking session meeting, I asked the participants 
if the summary of the interview was accurate and if there was any additional information 
they wanted to add.  
Data Collection Technique 
Qualitative researchers must understand various data collection techniques when 
conducting case study research (Yin, 2018).Researchers use interviews to gather 
information for case studies (Yin, 2018).Qualitative researchers have the flexibility to 
follow a predesigned protocol or deviate during interviews to probe for more in-depth 
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understanding from participants (McIntosh & Morse, 2015; Wilson, 2016). An interview 
protocol is a step-by-step guide that researchers use to facilitate detailed data collection 
(Benia, Hauck-Filho, Dillenburg, & Stein, 2015; Yin, 2018). The interview protocol 
contains an outline of the procedures and strategies used to conduct interviews (Dikko, 
2016). Further, the interview protocol contains content regarding the obligations to 
protect human subjects and requirements to obtain voluntary informed consent before 
conducting interviews (Yin, 2018). I obtained informed consent from each participant 
before conducting interviews. I conducted face-to-face, semistructured interviews using 
the same interview protocol for each interview (see Appendix). 
Researchers must receive approval from the Institution Review Board (IRB) 
before collecting data. Study participants must voluntarily provide their willingness to 
participate in the study after receiving all relevant information concerning the study 
through a process term informed consent (Bhattacharya, Dhiman, & Chaturvedi, 2016). 
After obtaining IRB approval, I visited each participants and provided an invitation to 
participate and provided the informed consent form. I afforded participants the 
opportunity to provide informed consent through replying I consent to the e-mail 
containing the informed consent form, sign, scan, and return the informed consent form 
through e-mail or U.S. Postal Service, or through signing the informed consent just prior 
to the interview. I coordinated with participants to select a location to conduct face-to-
face semistructured interviews. Before the beginning of the interviews, I explained the 
purpose of the interviews, the benefits of the study, the purpose of recording the 
interviews, and the reason for reviewing company documents. I obtained the signature of 
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each business owner or authorized representative on the Letter of Cooperation and the 
Confidentiality Agreement. During the interview, I asked probing and follow-up question 
to gather a more in-depth understanding of the phenomenon. After the interview, I thank 
participants for their time and their willingness to participate in my study. I explained the 
need for a 30-minute follow-up meeting that allowed the participant a chance to review a 
summary of the interview to verify the accuracy of the interview and to provide 
additional information if needed. 
Researchers may use multiple sources to collect data during case studies that 
include reviewing company archival records and documents (Yin, 2018). Qualitative 
researchers use documentation as a stable, low profile, and precise source of data 
collection (De Massis & Kotlar, 2014). To support data collected using interviews, 
researchers use secondary data sources, such as company documents, which might add 
value to the interviews and promote triangulation of the data (Renz, Carrington, & 
Badger, 2018). I requested company documents that included contracts awards, contract 
proposals, and statement of work. I obtained access to the company documents through 
the business owner or authorized representative signature on the letter of cooperation and 
confidentiality agreement. 
An advantage of face-to-face, semistructured interviews is the ability for the 
researcher and participant to establish a mutually beneficial relationship that allows the 
researcher to ask follow-up questions (Kallio et al., 2016). I used semistructured 
interviews to ask follow-up questions of participants that ensured I gathered rich data and 
gain a comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon of this study. A disadvantage of 
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conducting face-to-face, semistructured interviews occurs when participants refuse to 
answer interview questions (McIntosh & Morse, 2015). Participants refusing to answer 
questions might occur that will prevent gathering rich data to answer the central research 
questions in my study. Qualitative researchers use multiple sources of data to investigate 
a broader range of data and to improve credibility (De Massis & Kotlar, 2014; Yin, 
2018). The review of company documents supports triangulation of the data (Renz et al., 
2018). I reviewed company documents to triangulate participants’ interview responses 
related to this study. Researchers might face the disadvantage of participants deliberately 
withholding relevant documents (Yin, 2018). Participants did not withhold access to 
contract proposal documents and actual copies of federal contracts awarded to their 
companies in this study. 
Researchers conduct pilot case studies to develop, examine, or improve the 
research questions and processes used in a later official case study (Yin, 2018). 
Researchers conduct pilot studies to establish the feasibility and initial value of their 
prospective research study (Moss et al., 2015). Qualitative researchers might gather 
evidence to correct the interview protocol instruments and address biases discovered 
during the small-scale study (Chenail, 2011). Researchers might utilize a pilot case study 
to refine the data collection processes to ensure collection of rich data and to collect data 
following an established protocol (Yin, 2018). The limited scope of this study eliminated 
my need to conduct a pilot study.  
Qualitative researchers provide participants with a transcribed summary of the 
interview session that allows for participant validation of the trustworthiness of the 
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interview (Birt et al., 2016). Researchers use member checking to reduce errors in 
interpreting the collected data and to improve the dependability and credibility of the data 
(Fusch & Ness, 2015). I conducted a 30-minute follow-up session with each participant 
to conduct member checking of the summary of transcribed interview data. I provided a 
summary page of the transcribed interviews to the participants for review during the 
follow-up meeting. I asked participants to validate the accuracy of the summary and to 
provide any additional information required. 
Data Organization Technique 
Qualitative researchers generate a large volume of data in the form of transcripts 
and notes, which becomes a labor-intensive process (Zamawe, 2015). The development 
of computer-assisted data analysis software (CAQDAS) provides a system to handle, 
store, and manipulate data retrieved by researchers (Houghton et al., 2013; Woods, 
Paulus, Atkins, & Macklin, 2016; Zamawe, 2015). Researchers use CAQDAS, such as 
NVivo and ATLAS.ti, because of the ability to visually display data and study findings 
(Woods et al., 2016). NVivo and ATLAS.ti have features for researchers to create text 
files, transcribe audio and video files, transcribe field notes, and transcribe interviews 
inside the software (Woods et al., 2016). The NVivo software’s strength is the ability to 
link with multiple qualitative research designs and data analysis methods (Zamawe, 
2015). The use of NVivo supports data retrieval and search using queries that permit 
researchers the ability to ask questions and test developing themes (Houghton et al., 
2013). Qualitative researchers establish themes to capture and unite related attributes of 
the phenomenon along with their interrelationship (Houghton et al., 2013). I used NVivo 
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12 software in data analysis to transcribe interview data and to search for emerging 
themes. I stored notes, interview audio files, transcription of interviews, copies of 
company documents, and reflective journals in a locked filing cabinet in my home office 
that only I have access to the key. I stored all electronic files via a password-protected 
Microsoft OneDrive cloud-based storage drive. I will store data for 5 years and then 
delete all the electronic files and shred all paper files. 
Data Analysis 
Graue (2015) defined qualitative data analysis as a process of reporting, 
categorizing, and connecting the phenomena with the researcher’s interpretation. Data 
analysis includes coding, sorting, and examining of qualitative data (Chowdhury, 2015). 
Qualitative researchers analyze case study data by scrutinizing, grouping, tabularizing, 
testing, and recombining data (Yin, 2018).Graue stated triangulation occurs when 
researchers use data from an assortment of sources that use a variety of methods. Yin 
(2018) discussed four types of triangulation that included (a) data triangulation, (b) 
researcher triangulation, (c) theory triangulation, and (d) methodological triangulation. 
Qualitative researchers use methodological triangulation to gain a comprehensive 
overview of the phenomenon through collecting data from multiple sources that includes 
face-to-face interviews in case studies (Haddock-Millar, Sanyal, & Müller-Camen, 2016). 
Researchers triangulate within the same method to test the reliability of data sources 
(Amankwaa, 2016). Researchers employ cross-case comparison to increase the validity of 
case studies using methodological triangulation (Amankwaa, 2016). I used 
61 
 
methodological triangulation in this study to improve the dependability of the data and 
the credibility of the findings.  
Researchers use multiple sources of data when using methodological triangulation 
that might include interview data, observations, videos, newspapers, letters, books, and 
documents (Fusch & Ness, 2015; Graue, 2015). Fusch and Ness (2015) maintained 
methodological triangulation ensures researchers collect data that is full and robust. 
Graue (2015) asserted researchers conducting case study research use in-depth 
interviews, data coding, and methodological triangulation to ensure reliability and 
validity in data analysis. Yin (2018) contended that case studies allow researchers to 
concentrate in-depth on a case while maintaining a holistic and real-world view of the 
phenomenon using multiple sources of data. Qualitative researchers analyze case studies 
using pattern matching, explanation building, time-series analysis, logic models, and 
cross-case synthesis (Yin, 2018). I analyzed the data in this multiple case study using 
cross-case synthesis by compiling data, disassembling data, reassembling data, 
interpreting data, and concluding as suggested by Yin.  
Compiling Data 
Qualitative researchers obtain critical information from case studies by 
conducting face-to-face, semistructured interviews (Yin, 2018). Researchers use 
recording devices to verbatim capture data during interviews and use transcribed 
recordings to understand the interview data (Renz et al., 2018). I followed an interview 
protocol to conduct face-to-face semistructured interviews to obtain data (see Appendix). 
Zamawe (2015) used NVivo software to create a new project to compile all interview 
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transcripts, interview audio files, and notes. I used NVivo 12 software to compile and 
code interview audio files, transcriptions of interviews, copies of company documents, 
reflective journals, and results from member checking with participants.  
Disassembling Data 
St. Pierre and Jackson (2014) suggested coding transcribed interview data and 
sorting into themes. Researchers search for themes that capture and join associated 
elements of cases with links to how the themes related to each other (Houghton et al., 
2013). Qualitative researchers code, sort, and scrutinize collected data to increase 
understanding of the phenomenon (Chowdhury, 2015). I disassembled data by coding 
and sorting the data using NVivo 12 software to search for emerging themes.  
Reassembling Data 
Qualitative researchers group and categories dismantled coded data with similar 
themes into higher level concepts and classifications during the reassembling data stage 
(Ciemins, Brant, Kersten, Mullette, & Dickerson, 2015; Yin, 2015). Yin (2015) argued 
that CAQDAS, like NVivo 11, enhance researchers’s ability to reassemble data. I used 
NVivo 12 to group coded data into hierachical nodes to show the interactions of coded 
data to reveal emerging themes.  
Interpreting Data 
Researchers interpret data from the themes and patterns from coded data that 
capture and organize the intentions of participants (Houghton et al., 2013; Yin, 2015). 
Qualitative researchers employ qualitative data analysis software, such as NVivo 11, that 
might add rigor and support the systematic coding, organizing, and interpreting of large 
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amounts of data faster than manual methods (De Massis & Kotlar, 2014; Woods et al., 
2016). I interpreted the coded data by comparing and contrasting the themes and patterns 
using NVivo 12 software.  
Concluding Data 
Qualitative researchers finish the data analysis phase by linking the data 
interpretations and the central themes of the study that provide rich conclusions (Graue, 
2015; Palinkas et al., 2015; Yin, 2015). I concluded data analysis by scrutinizing the data 
for patterns and developing themes that align with my conceptual framework of agency 
theory. I connected my research questions of what strategies small business leaders in the 
services industry used to win open competitive federal contracts with the emerging 
patterns and themes from the data. Yin (2015) discussed comparing conclusions to 
previous research in the literature and similar recent studies. I concluded data analysis by 
comparing my conclusions to previous research in the literature and recent studies like 
my topic. 
Software Plan 
The use of CAQDAS, such as NVivo 11, is a means for the qualitative researcher 
to compile, organize, develop themes and patterns, and interpret data (Chowdhury, 2015; 
De Massis & Kotlar, 2014; Yin, 2015). Woods et al. (2016) claimed researchers’ use of 
CAQDAS might improve the rigor and trustworthiness of the data analysis. Zamawe 
(2015) maintained researchers prefer NVivo software because of being able to analyze 
data from multiple approaches. Qualitative researchers use NVivo to code and develop 
patterns and themes (St. Pierre & Jackson, 2014; Woods et al., 2016). To facilitate the use 
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of NVivo 12, I uploaded the interviews and company documents to develop codes and 
themes using Microsoft Word and Excel software. 
Key Themes 
Researchers identify repetitive patterns and important themes during data analysis 
that link to the phenomenon of the study (Houghton et al., 2013). Qualitative researchers 
investigate relationships between interview data, company documents, and observations 
to the central research question (St. Pierre & Jackson, 2014). Cope (2014) argued 
researchers compare existing literature and the emerging themes, patterns, and concepts 
seeking agreements and disagreements. I used key themes from the interviews and 
company documents to link to the conceptual framework of agency theory. I used NVivo 
12 to import the research questions, interview transcripts, and company documents to 
search for agreement and disagreement of the key themes found in the literature on 
agency theory. I compared the findings of this study to the findings within studies 
published in 2017-2018, noting whether my findings confirmed or refuted the outcomes 
published by these recent researchers.  
Reliability and Validity 
Researchers conducting a qualitative method study seek dependability instead of 
reliability (Morse, 2015a). The qualitative researcher strives to ensure the findings are 
credible, confirmable, and trustworthy rather than seeking internal or external validity 
(Cope, 2014; Morse, 2015a). In this research study, I strived to ensure the dependability 




Cope (2014) expressed that dependability is the steady application of data in 
comparable situations. Morse (2015a) asserted some methods researchers use to ensure 
dependability include triangulation and member checking. Triangulation denotes using 
numerous methods that expand the investigator’s depth of understanding of the 
phenomenon (Morse, 2015a; Turner, Cardinal, & Burton, 2016). Cope maintained 
allowing participants to verify the trustworthiness of the data is member checking. To 
achieve dependability in my study, I used methodological triangulation to deepen my 
understanding of the phenomenon. Additionally, I used member checking to ensure the 
data truthfully represents the meanings the participants shared during data collection. 
Credibility 
Credibility in qualitative case study research requires researchers to provide 
robust conceptual substance and clear study design that maintains the meaning of a case 
study (Bengtsson, 2016). Cope (2014) asserted that credibility improves when researchers 
explain their experiences and confirm the results with the participants. Houghton et al. 
(2013) suggested using triangulations that employ various methods to verify the data 
completeness. To ensure credibility in my study, I used purposeful sampling, member 
checking, and methodological triangulation. 
Confirmability 
Confirmability indicates that data is unbiased and truthful (Houghton et al., 2013). 
Researchers establish confirmability through recounting how assumptions and analysis 
occurred and by illustrating that the findings resulted from the data (Cope, 2014). To 
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ensure confirmability, the researcher may use triangulation, audit trails, and member 
checking (Houghton et al., 2013; Rapport, Clement, Doel, & Hutchings, 2015). To ensure 
confirmability, I used member checking, methodological triangulation, and audit trails to 
ensure data was unbiased and truthful. 
Transferability 
Transferability is the ability of others to use the findings of a research study by 
applying the results to other situations or groups (Elo et al., 2014; Moon, Brewer, 
Januchowski-Hartley, Adams, & Blackman, 2016). Elo et al. (2014) suggested the 
research originators might suggest transferability of the results, but transferability occurs 
when future researchers extrapolate the findings in the same or similar setting; however, 
the final decision resides with the reader if the results are transferable. In contrast, Moon 
et al. (2016) argued that the researcher is liable for providing adequate information to 
facilitate conclusions about the relative relationship to allow transferability. As the 
researcher, I provided rich data that provides sufficient proof of the transferability of my 
study results. 
Data Saturation 
Qualitative researchers achieve data saturation when participants provide the 
same information in response to interview questions that contain no new information 
(Merriam & Tisdell, 2015). Researchers aim to gather enough data with no new themes 
that allows replication of the study by others (Fusch & Ness, 2015; Houghton et al., 
2013). Interviews provide one method of achieving data saturation in qualitative research 
that can pair with member checking to ensure data saturation (Birt et al., 2016; Fusch & 
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Ness, 2015). Researchers use member checking to allow returning a summary of the 
transcribed interview to participants that enables validation of the trustworthiness of the 
data (Birt et al., 2016). Researchers collect data using multiple sources that merge themes 
and information to achieve methodological triangulation to link data (Fusch & Ness, 
2015; Yin, 2018). I conducted semistructured interviews to ask follow-up probing 
questions to elicit rich data and utilized member checking and methodological 
triangulation to ensure data saturation. The qualitative researcher needs previous 
information about the cases selected in a multiple case study as to how and why the ideal 
outcome of the cases might occur that allows duplication from case to case (Yin, 2018). I 
conducted interviews with business leaders in the service industry who have successfully 
used strategies to win open competitive U.S. federal contracts until no new themes or 
data emerged. 
Transition and Summary 
In Section 2, I restated the purpose of the study, listed the different research 
methods, and provided the rational for the research method for this study. Additionally, 
Section 2 included the reasoning for the research design, population and sampling, and 
requirement to ensure ethical research. I described the data collection instruments, data 
collection techniques, and data organization techniques for this study. Section 2 
concluded with my data analysis procedures, the plan to ensure dependability, credibility, 
and confirmability, and the means to reach data saturation. Section 3 contains (a) the 
presentation of the findings, (b) how the findings of the study are important to 
professional practice, (c) social change, and (d) recommendations for future research. 
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Section 3: Application to Professional Practice and Implications for Change 
Introduction 
The purpose of this qualitative multiple case study was to explore strategies some 
small business leaders in the service industry use to win open, competitive U.S. federal 
contracts. I collected data from six small business leaders in the state of Washington by 
conducting face-to-face, semistructured interviews and reviewing company documents. I 
employed methodological triangulation to compare the company documents with the 
interview data. I engaged in member checking with each participant to validate data 
collected and to obtain additional information. I continued data collection until no new 
themes, patterns, or codes emerged to reach data saturation. 
I used Yin’s (2018) five-step data analysis process of scrutinizing, grouping, 
tabularizing, testing, and recombining the data. I used NVivo 12 software to code 
transcribed interviews for themes. Three strategies developed as key themes: (a) 
opportunity identification strategy, (b) requirements review strategy, and (c) bid 
submission strategy. The findings in this section present the strategies some leaders used 
to win open, competitive U.S. federal contracts. I also link the findings to Jensen and 
Meckling’s (1976) agency theory. 
Presentation of the Findings 
The overarching research question for this study was “What strategies do some 
small business leaders in the service industry use to win open competitive U.S. federal 
contracts?” I asked the six small business leaders eight prepared interview questions 
along with probing follow-up questions to provoke a natural conversation. I obtained the 
69 
 
consent of each participant to record each interview. I transcribed the recorded interviews 
into an MS Word document and then uploaded the transcripts to NVivo 12 for coding and 
analyzing for themes. I prepared a summary of the transcribed interviews and conducted 
member checking with each participant until no new data or themes emerged. I 
triangulated the data by reviewing awarded contracts, statements of work, company 
capability statements, company websites, preaward bid proposal documents, and the 
FPDS-NG website to confirm the data gathered from the interview. I determined I 
reached data saturation when no new themes or patterns surfaced after the fifth interview. 
I completed the sixth interview to substantiate that I achieved data saturation as of result 
of new themes or patterns occurring from the data.  
I used the conceptual framework of agency theory to understand the strategies 
some small business leaders use to win open competitive federal contracts. Agency 
theorists explore the relationship between principals and agents, differences in goals, and 
risk tolerance in contractual relationships (Bhattacherjee, 1998; Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). The three major themes of this study support the tenets of agency theory, which I 
used to answer my research question: (a) opportunity identification strategy, (b) 
requirement review strategy, and (c) bid submission strategy. I used the first theme to 
understand how the participants attempted to establish a contractual relationship by 
taking steps to locate contracting opportunities. All the participants in this study 
employed strategies to identify federal contracting opportunities. I used the second 
theme, requirements strategy, to understand how the participants manage their tolerance 
for risk. All the participants indicated they employed a strategy of reviewing contract 
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requirements to ensure they had a comprehensive understanding of the requirements and 
evaluate the risk associated with the contract. I used the third theme of bid submission 
strategy to understand how the participants attempted to align their business goals with 
the goals of the federal agencies. Each of the participants said that they used a bid 
submission strategy to achieve their business goals through winning contracts. In Table 2, 
I display the major themes of this study.  
Table 2 
 
Major Themes: Strategies Use to Win Open Competitive Federal Contracts 
Strategy Participants # Percentage 
Opportunity identification strategy 6 100 
Requirements review strategy 6 100 
Bid submission strategy 6 100 
 
Theme 1: Opportunity Identification Strategy 
Agency theorists defined the contractual relationship as a mutual contract where 
the principal hires the agent to deliver or perform a service that includes delegated 
decision-making (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Steinle et al., 2014). The participants in this 
study expressed the need for small businesses to have a strategy of identifying federal 
contracting opportunities that fit their business model and risk tolerance. The participants 
in this study use a variety of tactics to identify opportunities. Some of the participants 
stated that finding the right opportunity requires using several different tactics to achieve 
business goals. My comments regarding the use of tactics denote a method the participant 
used to identify opportunities for contracting. The participants utilized three tactics to 





Tactics for Executing the Opportunities Identification Strategy 
Tactic Participants Percentage 
Access Federal Business Opportunities P1, P2, P3, and P5 66 
Direct Email from Contracting Officer P1, P4, and P6 50 
Third Party Subscription Service P1 and P2 33 
 
Access federal business opportunities. Federal contracting agencies are required 
to post federal contracting opportunities over $25, 000 to the Federal Business 
Opportunities (FBO) website, which is knowns as FedBizOpps (Ferris, Houston, & 
Javakhadze, 2019). Four of the six participants detailed how they used the FBO website 
to find opportunities to contract with the federal government. The FBO website was the 
preferred method utilized by participants P1, P2, P3, and P5. P1 explained, “FBO keeps 
us in the know on what is coming up that is where all the federal government post almost 
all their sources sought.” P1 provided me access to their current lists of contracting 
opportunities retrieved from the FBO website. I used the FBO printout of contracting 
opportunities to sort the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code 
from P1 to triangulate the information obtained during the interview and to compare the 
preawarded bid proposal documents. I found a list of contracting opportunities from 
various federal agencies seeking companies to perform services related to the NAICS 
code used by P1. I clicked on several of the opportunities, finding the synopsis of the 
project, the solicitation listing the contract requirements, the contracting officer contact 
information, and questions other potential vendors have asked related to the opportunity.  
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I found that the FBO site only stores opportunities for a year, and then FBO 
archives the opportunities. P1 and other business leaders can select to watch opportunities 
or add themselves to a list of interested vendors through a free registration process. The 
participants who accessed FBO to identify opportunities admitted to monitoring of the 
website to ensure the identification of the right contracting opportunity that fits their 
business goals. P3 stated, “I have a team member that deals with federal opportunities 
and responds to them.” P5 added, “I have a designated person who works probably 30 to 
35 hours week . . . [that] primary responsibility is to respond to RFPs.”  
Direct email from contracting officer. Some of the participants indicated they 
receive direct e-mails from the federal contracting agency. P1, P4, and P6 indicated that 
they received direct e-mails from federal contracting officers providing them insight into 
potential federal contracting opportunities. P1 stated, “Many solicitations are just emailed 
to us.” P4 commented, “We are on an email list that sends us all the federal and state bids 
opportunities to our office.” P1 remarked, “A lot of solicitations are just emailed to us.” 
P5 added, “I get daily emails that correspond to our NAICs codes.” The participants who 
received the e-mail notices indicated their past performance on previous contracts earned 
the trust of the federal agencies, prompting a personal invitation to bid on future 
contracts. The findings confirm the research of Njuguna (2016) that opportunistic 
behavior is limited when principals and agents build contractual relationships.  
Third-party subscription services. Contracting officers in federal agencies make 
contracting opportunities accessible to small businesses, which small business leaders use 
to identify opportunities and submit timely bids (Flynn & Davis, 2016b). Some of the 
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participants indicated that finding the right contracting opportunities requires relying on 
others to locate and supply them with potential contracting opportunities. P1 and P2 
commented that they signed up for a subscription service through the third-party website, 
FedConnect. P2 said, “We signed up at the FedConnect website for notification, and the 
site sends out notices when there are upcoming bid opportunities” P1 added, “We just go 
through daily notifications from FedConnect, so they know what [opportunities] are 
coming up.” P2 permitted me to view the FedConnect website on their office computer, 
and P1 allowed me to view paid invoices from FedConnect to confirm the use of the 
service. The findings uphold the research of Josephson, Lee, Mariadoss, and Johnson 
(2019) in that businesses must manage contractual relationships with their government 
customers to achieve the greatest business value. Figure 1 is a display of how small 




















Figure 1. Opportunities identification strategy implementation. 














The ability of small business leaders to establish a contractual relationship with 
federal contracting officers is a critical step in the small business finding public 
procurement tendering opportunities. Small business leaders must understand that public 
procurements differ from private sector procurements due to the political environment, 
which stimulates opportunistic behaviors resulting from contrasting goals (Adjei Bamfo 
& Maloreh Nyamekye, 2019). Small business leaders’ ability to establish a trusting 
relationship with federal contracting officers might reduce information asymmetries due 
to the open and candid communication established between the contracting parties 
(Flammer, 2018). The findings support the research of Bergh, Ketchen, Orlandi, 
Heugens, and Boyd (2019), who noted that in contractual relationships, one party 
attempts to exploit information while the other party attempts to mitigate opportunistic 
behavior and work towards uniform goal attainment.  
The opportunity identification strategy also aligns with Jensen and Meckling’s 
(1976) agency theory in that the participants employed strategies to review contract 
solicitations to determine the bonding costs from contract monitoring that might impact 
their business goals. Jensen and Meckling asserted that principals would incur increased 
bonding costs as they employ provisions that limit self-interested agent behaviors that 
harm the principal. A consistent theme from the six participants was the use of a variety 
of tactics to locate and evaluate contracting opportunities that met their business model 
and level of risk acceptability. During the precontractual stage, risk increases due to 
hidden information that influence the principal’s use of monitoring that raises the agency 
cost (Solheim Kile, Lædre, & Lohne, 2019). Jensen and Meckling argued that principals 
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control agency costs through monitoring activities and the use of incentives in attempts to 
decrease opportunistic agent behavior. The six participants conveyed doubt that federal 
contracting officers shared all the information required to win open competitive contracts 
in the solicitation, which is why they used multiple tactics to secure a contracting 
prospect with an opportunity identification strategy. Small business leaders’ ability to 
assess contracting opportunities for risk, business model alignment, and agency costs that 
occur due to the principal’s monitor activities is important to achieving balance to make 
decisions to seek contracts. Jensen and Meckling stated that a firm’s leader who fails to 
achieve equilibrium from information asymmetry should avoid the contract opportunity. 
Theme 2: Requirements Review Strategy 
Principals and agents establish risk expectations through the development of 
formal contracts (Eckerd & Girth, 2017). All the participants said that they review 
contracts requirements or specifications to ensure they understood the requirements of the 
contracts and to establish how risk will impact their business. The participants in this 
study used the words requirement, scope, and specification synonymously. P1 stated, 
“We go through and analyze the requirements to determine if the project is suited for us.” 
P4 added, “Some specifications are written that are outdated from what is required for the 
contract.” P5 affirmed, “I start by scanning the requirements to see who they are written 
for . . . half of the ones we review are written for someone else.” Federal agencies use 
specifications to influence vendors before award, during contract execution, and after 
completion of the contract (Bruno, Gelderman, Lambrechts, & Semeijn, 2018). P3 said, 
“You have to understand your capital needs to determine if the requirements will impact 
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your bottom line.” P1, P3, P4, P5, and P6 all indicated they use a team approach to 
reviewing and evaluating contracts requirements to determine if the risk of attempting to 
meet the requirements benefits their business goals. 
Agency theorists have also maintained that shifting risk between principals and 
agents reduces agency problems related to conflicting goals (Bendickson et al., 2016). P1 
declared, “We put together a team to scrutinize the requirements for the project; there are 
a lot of in-house people that get involve.” P5 expressed, “My team reviews and considers 
specifications, and we discuss the appropriate opportunities for our company.” P4 added, 
“We review the specific job and then decide as to whether we wanted to bid the project or 
not.” P6 commented, “We are looking for a job that has a lot of the components we are 
used to working with, so we know we can be efficient.” The participants of this study 
discussed the consequences of failing to scrutinize the contract requirements before 
submitting a bid. P3 indicated, “There are challenges when you fail to understand the 
scope and which impacts your ability to provide adequate pricing.” P6 stated, “A senior 
level employee failed to sufficiently review and analyze the scope of the job that resulted 
in extra work and cost for them.”  
I used the proposal and statement of work documents to verify the statements 
made by the participants. The statement of work contained an outline of the requirements 
of the contracts and how the contract monitoring would occur. I reviewed printouts of the 
statement of work that the participants used to compare with the contract solicitation 
before writing their proposals. I found that the statement of works contained the technical 
requirements the participants were required to accomplish for successful contract 
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completion. I found that some of the federal agencies use a statement of objectives or a 
performance work statement that gave the participants more discretion in the method of 
performance to meet the government requirements.  
The statement of work, performance work statements, and statement of objectives 
I reviewed distinguished the responsibilities of the government and the participants. I 
found that the government listed the contract monitoring procedures in each document 
reviewed. I crosschecked with the participant’s capability statements against the 
requirements in the solicitation and statement of work to verify if the requirements match 
the business function of the participants. The findings of this study support the claim that 
businesses incur increased risk if they fail to meet the minimum requirements of contracts 
(Eckerd & Girth, 2017). Figure 2 shows how small business leaders implement the 























Figure 2. Requirements review strategy implementation. 
Small business leaders that scrutinize contract requirements develop an 
understanding of the risk and monitoring requirements associated with the contracts. 
Federal contracting officers insert monitoring mechanism in contracts to alleviate 
vendors’ opportunistic behavior (Reim, Sjödin, & Parida, 2018). Small business leaders 
that establish relationships with federal contracting officers before reviewing contracting 
requirements that could resolve disagreements in the solicitation before the awarding of 
the formal contract (Solís Rodríguez & González Díaz, 2017). Leaders who conduct 
comprehensive analysis of contract specifications gain an understanding of the costs they 
will incur to comply with monitoring requirements and to mitigate contract risk (Reim et 
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businesses that fail to meet the minimum contract requirements experience increased 
cost, monitoring, and contract risk.  
This key finding aligns with Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) agency theory because 
reviewing contract specification through the use of a requirements review strategy 
provides small business leaders insight into the implicit and explicit rights and behaviors 
to meet delivery and performance standards of the contract. The participants in this study 
expressed that the specifications might fail to address the services they offer, which 
increases their investment of resources to meet the contract requirements. Jensen and 
Meckling expressed to accomplish information symmetry the contract requirements must 
express the ability of the principal to limit the actions of the agent. Bhattacherjee (1998) 
added the agent might decide to accept or reject the contract depending on the amount 
and type of incentives, the level of effort to require to achieve optimal performance, and 
monitoring activities in the contract requirements. The six participants agreed that failing 
to perform a comprehensive review of the contract requirements will increase their costs 
and risk; therefore, they utilized the requirements review strategy. 
Theme 3: Bid Submission Strategy 
Small business leaders make decisions to use limited resources to win public 
contracts despite the inherent risk associated with fulfilling the contract requirements 
(Woldesenbet & Worthington, 2018). The participants in this study stated the bid 
decisions requires consideration of their initial outlay of funds, the project time frame, 
and the level of effort required to win and complete the contract. P1 stated, “It comes 
down to estimating and if we have prior experience with this type of project.” P1 
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continued, “The more experience we have with the type of project, the better 
understanding we have of the true cost for this type of work.” P4 added, “We try to 
obtain the previous contract price from public records to aid us in preparing our bid 
proposal.” Federal agencies have policy driven goals requiring agencies to award 
contracts that reduce the overall contract cost and risk to the government which means 
many federal agencies award contracts to the business that provides the lowest price 
technical acceptable bid (Josephson et al., 2019). P3 said, “It boils downs to the numbers; 
whereas, the receiver of services could be better off if the criteria were based on a 
different range of factors besides price.” P2 indicated, “Our prices are competitive, and 
we have a solid reputation based on our prior performance.” All the participants 
expressed they felt their past performance or reputation with the contracting officer help 
their bidding strategy. This finding confirms the research of Flynn and Davis (2016b), 
who noted small businesses ability to exploit their resources through the improvement of 
their tendering abilities and the development of actionable strategies.  
Agency theorists acknowledged the goal incongruence between principals and 
agents influences contributes to opportunistic behaviors (Uenk & Telgen, 2019). The 
study participants articulated their desire to provide the best service to the government at 
a reasonable and fair price while sustaining their businesses. The study participants 
agreed that the government has a goal of awarding to the lowest price versus the best 
quality in order to save money. P4 stated, “We try to submit bids that focus on our 
quality, our supervision for the job, and then we focus on price.” P1 added, “We ask for 
clarification in the specifications up front, so the contracting officer is forced to provide 
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the answer to all bidders which forces everyone to bid the project like they are supposed 
to bid.” P3 expressed, “The receiver of services could do a lot better if the criteria were 
based on a range of factors of service besides price.” I compared the contract awards with 
a printout from FPDS, which I used to compare the value of the contracts won by the 
participant with the reported value in the FPDS database. I found a complete list of all the 
federal contracts that the participants won from 1999 to present. I was able to confirm the 
amounts of the award of the contract that the participants provided me and to see which 
federal agency had made the award. I found the contract type listed along with the North 
American Industry Classification System codes and the date of award and the period of 
performance. I then crosschecked the contract values from FPDS with the participants’ 
preaward proposal documents to see if the initial bids corresponded with the value of the 
contract award reported in FPDS. The findings of this study are consistent with the agent 
desire to align their goals with those of the principals by balancing quality, cost, and 
schedule to assist the principal in obtaining their goals at an affordable cost (Kim & 



























Figure 3. Bid submission strategy implementation. 
Small business leaders and federal contracting officers often approach public 
procurements with different goals that require the parties to align their goals to achieve 
shared goals. Federal contracting officers follow statutory requirements that habitually 
impose strict guidelines before permitting contract awards (Patrucco et al., 2017). Small 
business leaders depend on their understanding of markets that are competitive and that 
require negotiations and the ability to building relationships to sell their products and 
services (Elston, MacCarthaigh, & Verhoest, 2018). Federal contracting officers follow 
legal guidance from the FAR and other policy mandates to ensure competition and the 




















influence some business leaders to engage in opportunistic behaviors to win contracts 
(Flammer, 2018). The findings of this study confirm the research of Parker, Dressel, 
Chevers, and Zeppetella (2018) in that principals and agents have conflicting goals due to 
opportunistic behaviors of the agent which is curve by the use of a formal contract by the 
principal. 
The bid submission strategy aligns with Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) agency 
theory in that the six participants in this study were successful in establishing contractual 
relationships with federal agencies. Jensen and Meckling argued that principals and 
agents develop contractual relationships that incur effective monitoring with monetary 
and non-monetary agency cost intended to limit opportunistic agent decisions and benefit 
the principal. The participants agreed they submitted bids understanding the federal 
government awards contracts to the lowest price technically acceptable offer not 
necessarily the best service. Jensen and Meckling suggested that the legal framework that 
aligns the agent goals with the principal’s goals is the establishment of a contractual 
relationship. The six participants used the bid submission strategy to align their goals 
with the goals of the federal agencies by offering the lowest pricing for the government’s 
required services. 
Applications to Professional Practice 
Small business leaders seeking to win U.S. federal contracts might apply the 
findings of this study to win open competitive U.S. federal contracts. Small business 
leaders expressed fears when participating in competitive tendering that result from 
incomplete information related to the benefits that public procurement has on small 
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business success (Woldesenbet & Worthington, 2018). Small business leaders might 
apply the findings of this study to reduce small business leaders’ concerns in participating 
in competitive public procurements. Leaders might use the findings of this study to 
increase their understanding of the contract requirements and the terms and conditions 
employed by public buyers to monitor contract performance (Flynn, 2017). Leaders 
might use the findings of this study to duplicate the success of some small business 
leaders in the service industry that have successful use strategies that won open 
competitive U.S. federal contracts.  
Leaders’ ability to create value for their organization increases when they seek 
knowledge from sources inside and outside of their organization through knowledge 
sharing activities (Eidizadeh, Salehzadeh, & Chitsaz Esfahani, 2017). Small business 
leaders might apply the findings of this study to increase their knowledge of open 
competitive public procurement. Leaders reading this study might find the opportunity 
identification strategy useful in finding contracting opportunities for their businesses. The 
ability of small business leaders to connect with federal agency buyers through the 
establishment of contractual relationships reduce biased and barriers that reduce small 
business participation in competitive public procurements. Leaders might apply the 
findings of this study to establish a contractual relationship through the employment of 
successful strategies used to select and win open competitive contracts. Small business 
owners need effective strategies to participate in the public procurement process and 
obtain contracts with the U.S. government (Woldesenbet & Worthington, 2018). The 
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findings of this study might apply to leaders with different business models and a 
willingness to participate in public procurement.  
Small business leaders might use the findings of this study to develop strategies 
they need to overcome the barriers to public procurement participation. Researchers 
noted that small business leaders experience challenges participating in public 
procurement tenders because they lack strategies specific to public procurement (de 
Souza Dutra et al., 2017). Leaders might utilize the findings of this study to improve their 
communication with federal agencies and gather more information about public 
procurement tenders. Small businesses lack information about public procurement 
opportunities and access to the federal contracting officers that control public 
procurement (Saastamoinen et al., 2017). Leaders might use the findings of this study to 
establish open lines of communication with federal contracting officers and gain 
information related to the qualification standards required for competitive procurements. 
Implications for Social Change 
Federal agencies achieve cost savings through the use of open competitive 
tendering in public procurement when two or more businesses to compete for a contract 
(Moe, Newman, & Sein, 2017). Small business leaders benefit from public procurement 
when the tendering process is competitive (Glas & Eßig, 2018). Small business leaders 
are reluctant to compete for public procurement contracts due to an inability to identify 
suitable opportunities (Flynn & Davis, 2016a). The implications of the research for 
positive social change include the potential for small business leaders to create jobs and 
increase economic growth in local communities through the successful implementation of 
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an opportunity identification strategy. The findings of the study could result in social 
change through the strengthening of local communities economically and the increase of 
employment. Small business leaders are critical to economic growth, poverty reduction, 
innovation, and job creation (Ribeiro Soriano, 2017). Small business owners might use 
the findings of this study to increase growth within their local economy through 
successful engagement in the public procurement process for U.S. government contracts.  
Small business leaders might use the findings of this study to influence social 
change through the implementation of the requirements review strategy. Federal agencies 
write contract requirements with the minimum acceptable standards that small business 
leaders must meet to compete for contracts (Bruno et al., 2018). Federal agency leaders 
use the contract requirements to list the contract data, product and service expectations, 
general specifications, delivery schedule, and monitoring conditions (Dilawo & Salimi, 
2019). Small business leaders contribute to the economic growth of their local 
communities by employing local talent and sourcing goods and services from local 
suppliers (Parker, 2017). The implications of the research for social change include the 
potential for small business leaders to contribute to the lowering the local unemployment 
rate and improving the standard of living of the local community through implementation 
of a requirements review strategy. Leaders use extensive planning to ensure they address 
all the requirements of the contract (Gajjar, Smithwick, & Sullivan, 2018). The findings 
of the study could result in positive social change through the lowering on the 
unemployment rate and raising the standard of living of the local community. 
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The success of small business leaders depends on the utilization of all human, 
social, and financial resources to compile a bid that meets the contract requirements 
(Flynn & Davis, 2016a). Some small business leaders view participating and bidding in 
public procurement competitive tenders as unnecessarily complicated and expensive 
(Saastamoinen et al., 2017). Small business leaders’ ability to innovate increases when 
they participate in competitive federal procurement (Patil, 2017). The implication of the 
research for positive change includes the possibility for small business leaders in 
providing more innovative products and services to government buyers through the 
implementation of a bid submission strategy. The findings of the study could result in 
positive social change through the creation of innovative products and services and 
increase participation in competitive tenders that reduces the cost of procuring the 
products and services the government needs to operate. 
Recommendations for Action 
I recommend small business leaders use an opportunity identification strategy to 
find contracting opportunities. Small business leaders benefit from competitive and 
trustworthy public procurements through reliable payments for their products and 
services (Orser, Riding, & Weeks, 2019). Small business leaders benefit when they 
aggressively gather information on public procurement opportunities (Saastamoinen et 
al., 2017). Based on the findings of the study, small business leaders use an opportunity 
identification strategy to mitigate risk and to find opportunities that fit their business 
models. I recommend small business leaders use the FBO website to search for 
contracting opportunities because federal agencies must publish all procurement 
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opportunities over $25,000 to this website and searching this website is free. Based on the 
findings of the study, I recommend small business leaders attempt to establish a 
relationship with the federal contracting officers to receive advance notice of contracting 
opportunities. Small business leaders that commit to exchanges with their government 
customers realize performance benefits (Josephson et al., 2019). Small business leaders 
seeking U.S. government contracts might improve their business practices by 
implementing an opportunity identification strategy. 
Based on the findings of the study, I recommend that small business leaders use a 
requirements review strategy to evaluate the resources requirements and the risk 
associated with the contract. Federal contracting officers write contract requirements with 
the minimum standards that small businesses must meet for consideration for contract 
awards and success after award (Bruno et al., 2018). Small business leaders face a 
complex federal contracting system that includes numerous provisions, clauses, and terms 
in the solicitation requirements (Ferris et al., 2019). Some of the requirements used by 
federal contracting officers might include provisions for protecting proprietary 
information, how past performance effects contract qualifications, and narrowly written 
technical requirements (Schilling, Mazzuchi, & Sarkani, 2017). I recommend that small 
business leaders use a team approach to implement a requirements review strategy to help 
scrutinize contract requirements to evaluate the risk associated with contract 
performance. Federal contracting officer utilizes firm fixed price contracts to shift risk to 
suppliers of products and services (Eckerd & Girth, 2017). Small business owners might 
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use the findings of this study to recognize the exacting requirements within U.S. 
government contracts.  
Federal contracting officers utilize prerequisites for bid submissions that differ 
considerably from bid requirements in private sector procurements (Schilling et al., 
2017). Small business leaders that establish relationships with federal agencies and 
engage in prebid conferences experience above average bid results (Flynn & Davis, 
2016a). Based on the findings in the study, I recommend small business leaders 
implement a bid submission strategy to help determine the internal funding for successful 
contract performance, the human resource cost, and the amount of time need to complete 
the contract requirements. The selection of contract awardees in competitive public 
procurement often occur based on the lowest price (Bruno et al., 2018). Small business 
leaders that implement a bid submission strategy could increase their chances of 
submitting winning bids that meet the federal agencies requirements and allow the small 
business leaders to achieve financial objectives. 
The dissemination of the research findings provides the researcher with an 
opportunity to provide the findings to a broader audience of stakeholders (Carter, 2017). 
The participants of this study will receive an executive summary of the finding of the 
study. I will provide the local Chamber of Commerce a copy of the executive summary 
for their small business contracting assistance office. I will seek publication of the 
findings in the Journal of Contract Management published by the National Contract 
Management Association. I intend to publish the findings in the Journal of Public 
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Procurement. I plan to present the findings to a group of local federal contracting officers 
at their quarterly National Contract Management Association chapter meeting. 
Recommendations for Further Research 
A limitation of this study was the sample population of six small service business 
leaders who implemented strategies to win open competitive U.S. federal contracts. 
Future researchers could increase the scope of this study by using a larger sample size of 
small service business leaders. Another limitation of this study was the transferability of 
the findings by future researchers to other cases, settings, and industries due to the limited 
geographic region, which limits the scope. I recommend that future researchers explore 
the winning strategies of small services business leaders in a different geographic region 
to measure the transferability of the findings of this study. In this study, I explored the 
winning strategies used by small service business leaders. I recommend future 
researchers explore the winning strategies used by large service business leaders. I also 
recommend future researchers could examine the winning strategies used to win open 
competitive U.S. federal contracts using quantitative methods. I recommend that future 
researchers use quantitative methods to investigate how contract values influence small 
business leaders’ participation and their success rate in open competitive procurements. I 
also recommend that future researchers use a quantitative approach that examines how 
government set-asides and sole source contracts affect small business success rate in 




My decision to earn a doctorate while working fulltime has been the most 
challenging journey so far in my life. The journey has been long and demanding, but as I 
reflect, I have never wanted to quit. I have learned a lot about myself and my ability to 
push myself through adversity. I spent over 22 years of active duty in the U.S. Air Force, 
and I faced danger and hardships but earning my doctorate challenged me 
psychologically in ways and levels not realized during my military career. My most 
significant challenge was securing face-to-face interviews for data collection. I contacted 
over 70 potential participants for the six interviews I needed to complete data collection 
only to have interviews scheduled and then canceled. The failure to secure interviews 
challenged my resolve, but I never felt I would quit. Now, as I contemplate my future, I 
am excited that I earn a doctorate, and I understand how conducting rigorous research 
helps find answers. I have gained a deeper appreciation for the researchers around the 
world that spend their lives conducting research studies and publishing their findings to 
educate the world. 
I changed careers from managing airports to writing federal contracts in 2012, and 
completing this doctoral study has increased my knowledge in a new career in federal 
contracting. I have gained an understanding of how some small business leaders view the 
federal contracting process. I have gained an informed view of how policies enacted by 
our government impact the economy and business development. I feel that my experience 
at Walden University has provided me with the knowledge and skills needed to 
contribute to society positively. I have made some lifelong friends and collaborators 
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during my doctoral journey. I am looking forward to communicating and working with 
some of my doctoral peers as we embark on making positive social change. The decisions 
to pursue a doctorate fulfill a lifelong dream of becoming a doctor and impacting the 
world. I will use my experience at Walden University to continue pursuing my dreams 
and staying true to myself and desire to impact people. I believe my doctorate experience 
has inspired my children to never give up on their dreams. 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this qualitative multiple case study was to explore strategies some 
small business leaders in the service industry use to win open competitive U.S. federal 
contracts. I explored the winning strategies used by small business leaders through an 
agency theory conceptual framework. I gathered data from six small business leaders in 
the state of Washington that had implemented successful strategies to win open 
competitive U.S. federal contracts. I conducted face-to-face, semistructured interviews, 
and I reviewed awarded contracts, statements of work, company capability statements, 
company websites, pre-award bid proposal documents, and the fpds.gov website. I used 
member checking and Yin’s five-phase cycle of (a) compiling, (b) disassembling, (c) 
reassembling, (d) interpreting, and (e) concluding the data.  
Based on the findings of this study, I concluded that small business leaders use (a) 
an opportunity identification strategy, (b) a requirements strategy, and (c) a bid 
submission strategy to win open competitive U.S. federal contracts. The findings 
indicated that small business leaders that might find contracting opportunities that meet 
their business model and risk tolerance, strengthen their knowledge of contracting 
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requirements, and increase their participation in competitive public procurements. Small 
business leaders might use the findings of this study to impact positive social change by 
implementing the strategies noted in this study to lower the unemployment rate through 
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Appendix: Interview Protocol  
Interview preparation. After receiving approval from Walden University’s 
institutional review board, I will send an email to participants that include the informed 
consent form asking them to respond I Consent, if they agree to participate. When the 
participants agree to the interview, I will suggest a publicly available site, such as a 
library or community center, depending on the availability and a location that works with 
the participants’ schedule and preference.  
Opening the interview. I will thank the participants for agreeing to participate in 
my study and the interview. Next, I will introduce myself to the participants by providing 
them with my full name and providing them with the purpose of my study. I will explain 
the potential social and business benefits of my study. I will ask the participants if they 
have any questions before we begin the interview to ensure they are comfortable.  
Informed consent. I will verify that the participants received the informed 
consent by email. I will verify the participants responded I consent via email and that 
they have no objection to continuing the interview. If the participants have not responded 
I consent, I will have the participant sign the informed consent just before starting the 
interviews. I will inform the participants that I will be recording the interview for 
transcription purposes.  
Conducting the interview. I will conduct a semistructured interview with the 
following open-ended questions. 
1. What strategies do you use to identify U.S. federal contracting opportunities?  
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2. What strategies do you use to prepare proposals and bids to win open 
competitive U.S. federal contracts?  
3. What strategies do you use to win open competitive U.S. federal contracts? 
4. What strategies are most effective in winning open competitive U.S. federal 
contracts?  
5. How do you measure the effectiveness of the strategies you use to win U.S. 
federal contracts?  
6. What challenges do you face in implementing strategies to win open U.S. 
federal contracts?  
7. How do you overcome the key challenges of implementing strategies to win 
U.S. federal contracts?  
8.  What other information can you provide regarding the strategies you use to 
win open competitive U.S. federal contracts? 
I will provide participants plenty of time to fully answer each question. 
Follow up with probing questions. I will ask follow-up probing question for 
clarity and to gather additional information.  
Theme verification. I will ask the participants about the major themes discussed 
in the interview to ensure that I understood the intent of the participant 
Coding. I will code participants using alphanumeric characters to protect 
confidentiality. For example, I will use P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, and P6 to represent the 
participants. I will inform the participants that all the raw data, transcripts, and recordings 
will be secured using a password protected Microsoft OneDrive, a cloud-based storage 
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drive for a period of 5 years. I will remind them that only I will have access to the 
Microsoft OneDrive and the password. 
Recording reflexive notes. During the interview, I will observe the participants 
and take reflective notes of my thoughts and observations.  
Ending the interview. At the end of the interview, I will turn off the recorder. I 
will thank the participants for their time and the sharing of their experiences. I will 
inform the participants that I will contact them for a follow up session that is 
approximately 30 minutes to verify the accuracy of the transcripts. I will restate that I will 
secure all the raw data, transcripts, and the recording will be secured using a password 
protected Microsoft OneDrive, a cloud based storage drive for a period of 5 years. I will 
remind them that only I will have access to the Microsoft OneDrive and the password. I 
will reiterate that the no participants’ names or company names will be published in the 
study.  
 
